Signing a peace settlement guarantees neither peace nor justice

In 2012, I thought that two of the most important developments to emerge out of Latin America were the start of peace negotiations between the FARC and the government in Colombia and the gang truce the MS-13 and the 18th Street gangs and the government of El Salvador.

I'm sure there were other important events, maybe even more important, but the Colombian civil war had been going on for several decades, had cost the lives of nearly 300,000 people, and led to the displacement of millions. Colombia should be a leader in Latin America and the conflict was holding it back from realizing its true potential.

Two years later and after a few hiccups, the negotiations are still on track and WOLA just released an update with At Year’s End, It’s Clear: This Peace Process Is For Real.

A month ago, the FARC had another military captive, a far bigger prize: a Colombian Army general who wandered right into the guerrillas’ clutches. This time, though, the FARC let him go after just two weeks. Gen. Rubén Darío Alzate will spend Christmas at home with his family.

Why did the guerrillas’ behavior shift so radically? Again, they are in peace negotiations with the Colombian government. But this time, unlike 2001, they really don’t want them to end. A government suspension of the talks forced the guerrillas to choose between holding a general and continuing to talk peace. They chose peace.

While the FARC guerrillas are still rather strong, there seem to be so many parallels with the conflict in Guatemala. The duration and intensity of the conflicts are similar. Kidnapping that could have derailed the peace process occurred in both. Military and political elites attempting to undermine the peace process and push for all-out victory against a severely weakened foe or, at best, pushing for a negotiated surrender rather than more comprehensive reforms. A successful peace process and post-war are important to not only the people of Colombia but the entire region. Hopefully, the rapprochement between the US and Cuba is another good sign for the talks which have been taking place in Havana.

The second event was the February 2012 truce between El Salvador's two main gangs. Given that El Salvador's murder rate was above 70 per 100,000 at the time, several hundred thousand people were connected to the gangs in some way, and the weakness of the country's political institutions, I thought that dialogue and some sort of negotiation with the gangs by the government was an understandable and potentially positive development. I was never entirely confident that a total truce would hold but I thought that the Salvadoran government and international community would be able to use the opportunity to reintegrate and rehabilitate as many gang members as possible and to devise a more comprehensive government approach to the sources of the country's problems, of which gangs are just one. There was also the possibility that a successful truce in El Salvador, the place where it all began, would spread to gangs in Honduras and, to a lesser extent, Guatemala.

As 2014 closes in El Salvador, there are few signs that a truce exists. After decreasing from ~70 homicides per 100,000 in 2011, the rate settled in around ~40 in 2012 and 2013. Even with an increase in disappearances and, possibly, extortion, it was still a significant drop in violence. However, it looks like over 3,800 people will be murdered this year, 50% more than last year, and the rate should surpass 60. Gangs are at war with each other once again and the gangs and police are at war with each other. Nearly 40 police officers have been killed so far this year and over 100 gang members have been killed in shootouts with police. Several news stories also give the impression that security officers or other groups are engaged in extrajudicial executions of gang members.

There have been some successful reports of gang members receiving an education and jobs at bakeries and what not. The truce also seems to be still in effect in some areas such as Soyapango, Ilopango, Santa Ana, Sonsonate and San Vicente. With a more comprehensive plan, competent leadership, and domestic and international support, I know - that is asking a lot, the truce could have been more effective and reached a greater number of Salvadorans.

While a Salvadoran truce looks to be entirely in the past as the FMLN government scrambles for a new plan, the Colombian peace process is not yet a done deal. And as we have learned from the other peace processes in the region, especially Guatemala and El Salvador, signing a peace settlement guarantees neither peace nor justice.