Getting From Insurgency to Politics in WPR

Johanna Söderström, a post-doctoral fellow at the Department of Government, Uppsala University, has a good post on Getting From Insurgency to Politics that brings up a host of issues surrounding civil war resolution including the transformation of armed groups to political parties and the demobilization of non-state and state-based groups (the military).

A large part of ending civil wars and insurgencies is about finding new political solutions to old political conflicts. One such political solution and instrument has at times been to convert armed groups into political parties. Convincing former warring parties to enter formalized democratic politics is not an easy task however, and even when armed groups transform into political parties, the challenges for long-term democracy continue.

Research related to the political integration or reintegration of armed groups has been quite extensive. But political integration of armed groups is only one facet of a larger question about political integration of various entities after war. This larger question concerns not only armed groups, but also the political integration of former members of the military elite, as well as the political and democratic role of former rank-and-file combatants. Importantly, the challenges, justifications and explanations for successful outcomes within these categories are not interchangeable, even if the processes relate to and impact on each other. 

Political reintegration in the aftermath of war should therefore be divided into three areas: first, the transformation of the military elite into a political elite; second, the transformation of armed groups into political parties; and third, the transformation of individual rank-and-file combatants into citizens. Underlying all of these outcomes is the idea that each set of actors should operate in a democratic fashion and embrace democratic norms. Often this last leg is the main challenge, as former combatants and commanders and the new political parties may become politically functional but not necessarily democratically functional.

The questions that Johanna asks are related to the conference in Nairobi I traveled to earlier this month. How important is the transformation of armed groups into political actors for peace and stability in the postwar? Why are some some groups more successful than others at transforming into nonviolent political actors? And, finally, what role should the international community play in assisting armed groups in their attempted transformations?

The scholarly community has been looking at these first two questions, primarily through a series of case studies and comparative case studies. I've most looked at the Central American transitions but others have worked on the M-19 in Colombia and the Tupamaros in Uruguay as well as dozens of other groups around the world. Carrie Manning and Ian Smith have been putting together a data set on global transformations as well and that should be helpful in understanding some patterns over time and space.

The characteristics related to the armed group (number of combatants, popular support, and prior political experience) seem to be better predictors of successful transformations than institutional/environmental variables (electoral rules, national economic conditions). However, as in the case of the URNG in Guatemala, electoral rules can be quite important for smaller groups making such a transformation. Had the URNG been competing under the Hare method of translating votes to seats instead of D'Hondt, the new political party might have picked up several additional seats in 1999 and its future might have looked quite different.

Are the successful transformations of armed groups into political parties necessary for peace? I don't know. We seem to be operating under that assumption but I'm not sure that it has been necessarily tested. And what role should the international community play in helping armed groups transform? That's a tricky one. As Johanna smartly points out

The main challenge is that the process of transforming armed groups into political parties risks solidifying the political conflict that fueled the armed struggle to begin with, hindering society’s ability to move beyond these conflicts. Thus, the post-war society may have to deal with politics structured around the same divisions and issues for a long time to come. This could effectively freeze the conflict and potentially hinder other political actors and parties from developing.

Hence, this agenda or policy option can be pursued too vigorously if the creation of political parties on the basis of former armed groups restricts the political arena from including other political parties and if the conflict lines are not resolved, but simply reinforced through these parties. An armed group turned political party may develop a rich political agenda, diversify and change over the years, but if it fails to do so, it becomes an impediment to the development of democratic politics. At the same time, this potential tradeoff also speaks to the main justification for such transformation: It allows the various actors to channel the grievances that fueled the conflict and address the conflict’s causes in a nonviolent manner.

I lean towards providing support to the entire political system (institutional support and support to all political actors) rather than a specific focus on the armed actor at least as it comes to what the UNDP is thinking right now but I could be persuaded otherwise.