Will history repeat itself in El Salvador? An ARENA campaign based on fear? (update)

Will history repeat itself in El Salvador? Here is what Sonja Wolf wrote about the 2009 elections in El Salvador in a 2009 article on Subverting Democracy: Elite Rule and the Limits to Political Participation in Post-War El Salvador.

Pre-electoral polls had consistently predicted a leftist victory, although such projections meant little: in 2004 the FMLN's earlier lead was overturned by a substantial margin, and in 2009 Mauricio Funes' initially substantial lead dwindled considerably during the final weeks of the campaign.

Meanwhile, the campaign developed patterns reminiscent of previous electoral processes.

By January 2009 ARENA and its front organisation Fuerza Solidaria were dominating 73 per cent of the political advertising market.169 Fuerza Solidaria also sponsored TV and radio spots and gave talks to public- and private-sector workers, ‘educating’ voters about the FMLN's links with Hugo Chávez and the adverse consequences of a leftist win for El Salvador.170 Similarly, government officials and the leading media sought to associate the FMLN with Colombian rebels, street gangs and irregular armed groups supposedly active in the country, insinuating that an FMLN win would invite more violence.171 Despite persistent and serious irregularities on election day, voting occurred in tranquillity and ended in an historic triumph for the FMLN.

The FMLN links to Hugo Chavez and Venezuela, Colombian rebels, street gangs...where have we heard all this before? Oh that's right. Every single election for the last decade.

***ARENA warns about FMLN-gang links in the run up to February's elections. Meanwhile President Funes warns that he is concerned that the increase in pre-electoral gang violence is an attempt to improve ARENA's prospects in the elections. This is nothing new.

Here's what I wrote about ARENA's use of fear for a conference paper two years ago:

ARENA has also benefited from campaigns that were based upon fear. In 1994, citizens who might have naturally been inclined to vote for the economic reform-minded FMLN instead marked their ballots for ARENA out of fear that an FMLN victory would reignite the war. Wantchekon (1999, 1999a), Ellman and Wantchekon (2000), and Wantchekon and Neeman (2002) argue that the uncertainty surrounding the durability of the peace process led many Salvadorans to vote for ARENA even when doing so went against their economic interests. Wantchekon uses a game theoretic model to explain the support achieved by the ARENA over the FMLN. Wantchekon and his coauthors speculate that had voters been assured that a return to political violence was not possible, the FMLN could have emerged victorious in 1994. However, Salvadorans valued a choice (ARENA) that they thought would be more likely to lead to a definitive end to the war over a choice (FMLN) that would be more likely to promote economic reform (land redistribution) which would have directly benefited them.

Similar to Wantcheckon (1999 and 1999a), Ellman and Wantchekon (2000) find that voters in 1994 supported ARENA not because they approved of their political platform, per se, but rather because they feared that an FMLN victory would lead to disruption of the peace process. Wood (2000: 249) also argues that ARENA did an effective job of convincing Salvadorans that a vote for the FMLN might lead to a return to violence. Several FMLN militants were assassinated in the months leading up to the vote which helped to reinforce this belief. Ellman and Wantchekon (2000) also argue that many FMLN candidates hoped not to win in the 1994 elections, as they feared their victory would destabilize the country and put an end to the peace accords. Barnes (1998) also argues that fear of what an opposition victory would mean kept many FMLN supports from voting. When the FMLN achieved better electoral results in 1997, Ellman and Wantchekon (2000) contend that the party’s improved performance was caused by the decreasing risk that its victory would lead to unrest and that democracy had become more consolidated. The authors point out that the FMLN vote increased at a time when ARENA's economic policies, to which the FMLN was opposed, were helping the economy grow at a rate of 4%.

In order to understand 1994 election, Ellman and Wantchekon (2000) “present a model that helps to predict how threats against the electoral process influence platform choice by political parties, which party wins the election, and the policy outcomes finally implemented” (499). They hypothesize that the “stronger” party has a better chance of winning elections if its ability to cause political unrest is not well known and the “weaker” party, as it is aware of the potential for political unrest, will often take up a more centrist party platform in order to avoid disruption by actors that directly or indirectly support the “strong” party. Like Wantchekon, Wood (2000: 249) appears to agree that the FMLN held back in its criticism of ARENA because it was difficult for the party to criticize ARENA while, at the same time, not making it look like they were an unreliable peace partner. The FMLN’s selection of the moderate social democrat Rubén Zamora was more radical than would have been Abraham Rodríguez but less so than had they selected one of the former commanders.

While a fear of a return to war would disappear in later elections, fear remained an issue on which ARENA would continue to capitalize. In 1999, ARENA and the media demonized Facundo Guardado and his military experience as a guerrilla commander. ARENA and the media would do the same in 2004 with Schafik Handal when they “portrayed Handal as a hot-tempered and despotic individual who had masterminded kidnappings and was determined to turn El Salvador into a Cuban-style dictatorship.” His victory would jeopardize economic and political relations with the United States (Wolf 2009: 451). Business owners convinced their employees to support ARENA out of “fear” for what would happen should the FMLN and Handal emerge victorious, insinuating that their jobs would be lost should ARENA lose. ARENA, the media, and certain members of the US government also let it be known that an FMLN victory might lead to the deterioration of relations between El Salvador and the US. An FMLN victory would lead to capital flight, an end to Temporary Protected Status for Salvadorans residing in the US, and an interruption of remittances. In both 2004 and 2009, ARENA campaigns argued that the FMLN would turn the country into another Venezuela.

If it wasn’t the FMLN that Salvadorans should fear, it was the maras (Wolf 2009). ARENA argued that its mano dura and super mano dura policies would be more likely to save the Salvadoran people from escalating levels of violence. In a paper presented at the Latin American Studies Association in 2009, Randy Sunwin Uang explored the relationship between crime, voter intimidation, economic growth, and campaign issues and Antonio Saca’s ARENA victory in the 2004 presidential election. Uang found Salvadorans who understood crime or gangs as the most pressing issue for the country rather than unemployment, poverty or economic issues, were more likely to vote for Saca and ARENA. Voter pressure, concerns with neoliberal policies, the FMLN’s choice of Schafik Handal, and concerns about the continuity of remittances should the FMLN emerge victorious, might each have had a small impact on the outcome of the vote, but crime was the primary factor. ARENA and the media then made sure was that violence was at the forefront of voters’ concerns.