Early attempts to negotiate an end to the Salvadoran civil war

Ricardo Valencia carried out a brief interview with Salvadoran Ambassador to the United States Francisco Altschul for the USC Center on Diplomacy's CPD Blog. Ambassador Altschul was a member of the FMLN-FDR diplomatic commission during the civil war and spent a great deal of the war engaged in public diplomacy in the United States and Europe.

The FMLN-FDR's job was to promote and to sell the idea of the urgency of a political settlement in Washington, D.C. The basic idea was to make people understand that the best solution for everybody involved was the process of dialogue and negotiation, and that the FMLN was serious in its call for a political settlement, the idea of negotiations was not simple tactical move.

I'm pretty sure that Ambassador Altschul was referring to the late 1980s but there were also moments in the early years of the war where the FMLN and moderate civilian and military officials as well as the Cubans were exploring the possibility of a political solution.

In Back Channel to Cuba: The Hidden History of Negotiations between Washington and Havana, William LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh document efforts by Cuba to reach out to the US to resolve the Salvadoran civil war through negotiations. El Faro has an excerpt (more of less).

In February 1981, Cuba reached out to the US and indicated its support for negotiations. As a demonstration of good will, the Cubans had reduced military support for the FMLN. Here we are only weeks removed from the FMLN's first final offensive and Reagan's January 20th inauguration. The Mexican government also tried to mediate in July, October and November 1981 and then February to April 1982. Lopez Portillo's government had become very close to Nicaragua and had become very engaged in Central America overall, which didn't sit well with the US. The Mexican and French governments would then sign A Common Position Between Mexico and France Regarding El Salvador, which would recognize the FMLN as a belligerent force in 1981.

From what Alberto Martin and I have found, the Cubans were encouraging the FMLN and the URNG to negotiate a political solution to the war so as to consolidate the revolutionary processes in Cuba and Nicaragua. Another victory by leftist forces in El Salvador, less likely Guatemala, might have increased the possibility of direct US military intervention on the isthmus - something that they wished to avoid. Here is what we wrote in Unity and Disunity in the FMLN (let me know if you'd like a copy):

The available information suggests that the PCS, the RN, and the Popular Social Christian Movement (MPSC) explored the possibility of negotiations with the governing junta, controlled by the PDC, before the March Constituent Assembly elections (U.S. Department of State 1982).3 According to Eduardo Sancho, a former RN leader and member of the FMLN General Command, the FMLN signed a pact in Havana in 1982 on the initiative of the RN and the ERP, whereby it agreed to renounce its pursuit of a dictatorship of the proletariat and to accept a democratic process (Sancho 2004). Not everyone agreed with the declaration, but after making clear his reservations, FPL general secretary Carpio signed the agreement.

It is important to mention that the Cuban and Sandinista governments supported the combined strategy of negotiation and armed struggle and even pressured Carpio into accepting this change (Sancho 2004; Kruijt 2008, 64).5 Havana was apparently willing to sacrifice the revolution in El Salvador (and Guatemala) in exchange for the consolidation of the Sandinista revolution. In August 1983, the Cuban government made the U.S. government aware of its willingness to stop supplying weapons to the FMLN and to persuade FMLN leaders to participate in the political process in exchange for the United States’s ceasing its support for the Contras (U.S. Department of State 1983). The U.S. escalation in El Salvador and the slim prospect for a quick FMLN triumph were responsible for the new Cuban perspective.

This battle over FMLN political and military strategy in El Salvador contributed to the murder of Ana Maria and the suicide of Carpio.

It's possible that Cuban overtures were sincere, but the US did not trust the Cubans. I'm not entirely convinced that the FMLN or URNG were willing to sacrifice their revolutionary dreams in order to secure those of Nicaragua and Guatemala. And it is nearly certain that most military and elites in El Salvador and Guatemala wanted nothing to do with regards to negotiations with the insurgents beyond surrender and we might talk.