Community-based crime and violence prevention success in Central America

The Latin American Public Opinion Project recently released its study on the effectiveness of USAID programs in Central America with USAID’s Community‐Based Crime and Violence Prevention Approach in Central America Found Effective in LAPOP Impact Evaluation. Basically, everything that USAID is doing is effective and should be the foundation for additional US assistance to Central America - not going on a war footing in El Salvador. However, and not surprisingly, not all programs are equally successful.

Specifically, LAPOP found that the approach produced a significant reduction in the level expected of crime victimization and violence and also resulted in a significant increase in the level expected of citizens’ sense of security. Perception of neighborhood insecurity and perception of insecurity when walking alone at night declined more than would be expected without USAID intervention. Levels of satisfaction with police performance and trust in the police have increased significantly over the levels expected in the absence of the treatment. Indirect effects of the programs include strengthening democratic values, which increased significantly over the expected level in the absence of the program.

Following the qualitative and quantitative analyses, they make the following policy recommendations:

Making community‐based crime and violence prevention programs a frontline weapon to improve citizen security is key. So, too, is improving community organizations to address crime and violence.  

Schools and families also play a vital role in decreasing instances of crime and violence. Expanding pre‐school, after‐school, and day‐care access for children living in single‐parent homes would be beneficial. Working with school administrators is important. Continuing to inform administrators and teachers on important issues such as recognizing signs of abuse in children is necessary. Directing more resources to school security, especially in the form of patrols when students enter and leave school, could prove useful both in cutting down violence in the schools and protecting children from gang members who lurk outside the school grounds. Lastly, given the aforementioned positive role of religious organizations, actively partnering with these organizations to support church‐affiliated youth programs is likely to be fruitful.

The situation in Central America often feels overwhelming to me. Just where do you start amidst such poverty, violence, and corruption. However, building upon the successes of previous US AID programs, extending CICIG's mandate in Guatemala (and hopefully considering an extension to the rest of Central America, and some limited immigration reform on the part of the US can bring about an improvement in the quality of life of a significant number of Central Americans.

Early attempts to negotiate an end to the Salvadoran civil war

Ricardo Valencia carried out a brief interview with Salvadoran Ambassador to the United States Francisco Altschul for the USC Center on Diplomacy's CPD Blog. Ambassador Altschul was a member of the FMLN-FDR diplomatic commission during the civil war and spent a great deal of the war engaged in public diplomacy in the United States and Europe.

The FMLN-FDR's job was to promote and to sell the idea of the urgency of a political settlement in Washington, D.C. The basic idea was to make people understand that the best solution for everybody involved was the process of dialogue and negotiation, and that the FMLN was serious in its call for a political settlement, the idea of negotiations was not simple tactical move.

I'm pretty sure that Ambassador Altschul was referring to the late 1980s but there were also moments in the early years of the war where the FMLN and moderate civilian and military officials as well as the Cubans were exploring the possibility of a political solution.

In Back Channel to Cuba: The Hidden History of Negotiations between Washington and Havana, William LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh document efforts by Cuba to reach out to the US to resolve the Salvadoran civil war through negotiations. El Faro has an excerpt (more of less).

In February 1981, Cuba reached out to the US and indicated its support for negotiations. As a demonstration of good will, the Cubans had reduced military support for the FMLN. Here we are only weeks removed from the FMLN's first final offensive and Reagan's January 20th inauguration. The Mexican government also tried to mediate in July, October and November 1981 and then February to April 1982. Lopez Portillo's government had become very close to Nicaragua and had become very engaged in Central America overall, which didn't sit well with the US. The Mexican and French governments would then sign A Common Position Between Mexico and France Regarding El Salvador, which would recognize the FMLN as a belligerent force in 1981.

From what Alberto Martin and I have found, the Cubans were encouraging the FMLN and the URNG to negotiate a political solution to the war so as to consolidate the revolutionary processes in Cuba and Nicaragua. Another victory by leftist forces in El Salvador, less likely Guatemala, might have increased the possibility of direct US military intervention on the isthmus - something that they wished to avoid. Here is what we wrote in Unity and Disunity in the FMLN (let me know if you'd like a copy):

The available information suggests that the PCS, the RN, and the Popular Social Christian Movement (MPSC) explored the possibility of negotiations with the governing junta, controlled by the PDC, before the March Constituent Assembly elections (U.S. Department of State 1982).3 According to Eduardo Sancho, a former RN leader and member of the FMLN General Command, the FMLN signed a pact in Havana in 1982 on the initiative of the RN and the ERP, whereby it agreed to renounce its pursuit of a dictatorship of the proletariat and to accept a democratic process (Sancho 2004). Not everyone agreed with the declaration, but after making clear his reservations, FPL general secretary Carpio signed the agreement.

It is important to mention that the Cuban and Sandinista governments supported the combined strategy of negotiation and armed struggle and even pressured Carpio into accepting this change (Sancho 2004; Kruijt 2008, 64).5 Havana was apparently willing to sacrifice the revolution in El Salvador (and Guatemala) in exchange for the consolidation of the Sandinista revolution. In August 1983, the Cuban government made the U.S. government aware of its willingness to stop supplying weapons to the FMLN and to persuade FMLN leaders to participate in the political process in exchange for the United States’s ceasing its support for the Contras (U.S. Department of State 1983). The U.S. escalation in El Salvador and the slim prospect for a quick FMLN triumph were responsible for the new Cuban perspective.

This battle over FMLN political and military strategy in El Salvador contributed to the murder of Ana Maria and the suicide of Carpio.

It's possible that Cuban overtures were sincere, but the US did not trust the Cubans. I'm not entirely convinced that the FMLN or URNG were willing to sacrifice their revolutionary dreams in order to secure those of Nicaragua and Guatemala. And it is nearly certain that most military and elites in El Salvador and Guatemala wanted nothing to do with regards to negotiations with the insurgents beyond surrender and we might talk.

Reflecting on the passing of US Ambassador to El Salvador Robert White

The following post by Tommie Sue Montgomery reflects on the late US Ambassador to El Salvador, Robert White. Tommie Sue wrote the post shortly after Ambassador White's passing and was kind enough to allow me to reproduce it here. Tommie Sue has been one of the foremost experts on El Salvador for the last several decades and I will forever be grateful to her for inviting me into her home in San Salvador during one of her three Fulbrights and sharing her contacts and wisdom.

Ambassador Robert White’s passing in a sense marks the end of an era. He is being justly lauded for speaking truth to power and losing his job—U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador--for it. In the 1980s he became one of the most eloquent, vociferous critics of the Reagan Administration’s ideologically-driven, misguided and destructive Central America policy. In Washington no one was more outspoken that Bob White in denouncing the policy and advertising its flaws—and for that, Central Americans, especially Salvadorans, can be grateful.

Nevertheless, it is important to remember that it wasn’t always so, that it took the murder of four US churchwomen in December 1980 to effect Bob White’s epiphany. In the months before that, he was the dutiful ambassador, the voice for a Carter Administration desperate to avoid another Nicaragua (the Sandinistas had overthrown the US-supported Somoza dictatorship the year before). I know because I was there, doing research for a book that would be published in 1982.

Bob arrived in El Salvador in late February 1980, three months after a coup d’état, led by young, progressive army officers, ousted the brutal president-General Carlos Humberto Romero. The ambassador invited me for a long breakfast at his residence, where I shared everything I had learned during my previous months in El Salvador. The fundamental problem, I said, was that even before the coup occurred, right-wing officers managed to reassert control over events, thus derailing the good intentions of the new civilian-military junta. In this they were abetted by then-US Ambassador Frank Devine, a clueless functionary who believed that the new junta represented a thinly-disguised slide toward socialism. Thwarted at every turn, the junta resigned in late December and the second junta lasted just two months. Many of their members, threatened by death squads, went into exile. I said that El Salvador was headed for civil war, that the leftist organizations had broad popular support, and that the only alternative was to condition all military assistance on major reforms in the army—which meant cleaning out the top brass.

White arrived as the third junta was being formed. With some U.S. arm-twisting, the army accepted the hated Christian Democrats as partners and José Napoleon Duarte, who had won the presidency in 1972, been denied victory by the army, and then forced into exile for several years, now saw his chance to be “president”—of the military-dominated junta—and seized it. Ambassador White and the Carter Administration hailed this as an advance toward democracy and pretended that Duarte actually had power—until the nuns and church worker were murdered by the National Guard.

A month after Ambassador White arrived, Archbishop Oscar Romero was assassinated while saying Mass. The embassy expressed outrage and the Ambassador attended the funeral, but he did not press for an investigation, although it was obvious to everyone who knew anything about El Salvador that Romero had been murdered by a right-wing death squad tied to the military. Years later this would be confirmed.

In the intervening months state-sponsored terrorism reached new levels with hundreds of real and suspected leftists as well as prominent human rights advocates disappearing and usually turning up dead. The US Embassy lamented the deaths but downplayed their magnitude. The official line was, “El Salvador is facing a leftist (or communist) threat but is on the road to democracy.” The proof was always that Duarte was president of the junta.

In November leaders of the Democratic Revolutionary Front, a centre-left coalition, were seized from a Jesuit high school where they had scheduled a press conference. The kidnappings occurred in broad daylight; the surrounding streets had been sealed off by police, and the six men turned up dead on roads near the capital. Ambassador White expressed dismay but little more. El Salvador was still on the (difficult) road to democracy. Also in November Ronald Reagan was elected president and his foreign policy transition team wasted no time announcing to Latin America’s many military rulers that Carter’s human rights’ policy was a dead letter. The Salvadoran military and death squads understood, correctly, that they had just been given carte blanche.

Then Maura Clarke, Ita Ford, Dorothy Kazel and Jean Donovan were raped and murdered. For Bob White, the veil of hypocrisy that enveloped the Salvadoran government was torn away. He finally saw the government, the military for what it was: a bunch of right-wing, murderous thugs who would stop at nothing to preserve their power.

A month later the civil war began, lasted 11 years, cost over 70,000 dead and over $6 billion in U.S. military assistance. After peace accords in 1992 the former guerrillas became a legal political party, won the presidency in 2009 and repeated their victory in 2013. I have often wondered how different history would have been had Bob White and the Carter Administration understood in March 1980 what they finally grasped nine months later.

US and Latin America: A Clash of Histories

Orlando J. Pérez, Associate Dean of the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at Millersville University of Pennsylvania has an opinion piece for the Pan American Association of Philadelphia on A Clash of Histories.

The people and government of the United States have relatively short memories and believe inexorably in progress. Tomorrow is always better than yesterday! For Latin Americans history defines the present. Historical grievances shape the way countries relate to one another (for example, Bolivia’s ongoing struggle to regain its “access to the sea” from Chile). In the case of the United States, Latin Americans find it very hard to forgive and forget the alleged abuses committed against the region in the past 150 years. They remember every military invasion, CIA covert program and exploitation by U.S. transnational corporations.

For their part, U.S. leaders want to focus on the billions of dollars of aid and support for democracy. President Obama in particular has been keen on emphasizing practical solutions to problems rather than on offences that happened “before I was born.” Ironically, among the most hardline presidents at the Summit it was Raúl Castro who gave the most credit to President Obama’s new approach. After excoriating the United States for violations of Cuba’s sovereignty, Mr. Castro said “I apologize to him because President Obama has no responsibility for this.” Mr. Castro then said “President Obama is an honest man.” In acknowledging that President Obama has “no responsibility” for the past—something that leaders like Ecuador’s Correa or Venezuela’s Maduro actually disagree with—Mr. Castro is perhaps reflecting the realization that holding on to historical grievances might not serve the interest of the Cuban people or the survival of his regime.

Great insights from Orlando. Honestly, however, I'm not so sure how well the difference holds up to more intense scrutiny. I'd say that the Obama administration and Democrats in general have moved on from the Cold War. They might have problems with Castro's Cuba and Ortega's Nicaragua, but not necessarily because of those individuals and countries' Cold War histories. The Democrats will focus on the lack of democracy and human rights and corruption.

However, it is difficult to listen to Republican operatives (Noriega, Cardenas, Abrams) and elected officials (Rubio) criticizing those two countries, or the entire region's left, without emphasizing the Cold War. Republicans might mis-remember what actually happened during the Cold War, but they will never forget.

While the official/government left in the US has tried to move on, I'm not sure the public left in the US has. And even there it's been difficult. The Obama administration and State Department have tried to work with the FMLN in El Salvador but there is lingering mistrust from the US born out of Cold War histories (plus many other more recent causes of concern). Those US citizens who work / volunteer in Guatemala will always start off with the 1954 CIA coup against Arbenz 61 years years ago which isn't entirely wrong but isn't entirely helpful for trying to understand US - Guatemalan relations in 2015 (necessary but not sufficient).

Migration in Central America: Magnitude, Causes and Proposed Solutions

Dinorah Azpuru and Violeta Hernandez have a nice overview of the causes and consequences of migration from Central America to the United States in the Konrad Adenauer's current issue on Migration and Refugees. Here is the introduction for their Migration in Central America: Magnitude, Causes and Proposed Solutions.

Migration from Central America to other countries, particularly the United States, has been occurring for many decades. But in the summer of 2014 it reached crisis proportions when thousands of Central American minors – most of them not accompanied by an adult and after a dangerous journey through Mexico – crossed the border between Mexico and the United States and willingly surrendered themselves to the U.S. Border Patrol. It was the tip of the iceberg of deep-rooted problems in Central America (more specifically in the Northern Triangle) that involve not only poverty and lack of access to basic services such as health care or education, but also growing violence in those societies. Moreover, it exposed the dysfunction of the U.S. immigration system.

These incidents made headlines for several weeks and prompted the adoption of short-term measures to stop the flow of undocumented young migrants and women with small children. Government-led media campaigns to stop the migrants, the deportation of many of them by U.S. and Mexican authorities, as well as the late summer heat in the desert areas of the border helped to slow down the upsurge. However, the underlying causes remained and normal patterns of migration continued. In November 2014, the three presidents of the Northern Triangle – Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras – launched in Washington D.C. a long-term plan, called “The Alliance for Prosperity”, to promote development in these countries and thus discourage migrants from leaving their homes. Therefore, it is worth examining the extent of migration from Central America in recent years, presenting a profile of the migrants, and discussing the push and pull factors, as well as other structural variables that contribute to migration. An assessment of the feasibility of the Alliance for Prosperity will complement the analysis.

It's a good, comprehensive piece that would work well in an undergraduate class on Latin American politics, immigration or some other related material.

US out on a limb in the Northern Triangle?

From Claire Luke's US out on a limb in the Northern Triangle?

The specifics of a proposed $1 billion assistance plan to Central America remain in limbo as the U.S. Congress tries to determine the level of political will from the presidents of Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador — the countries the plan is meant to support.

Concern over the buy-in from the Central American leaders comes as Congress is assessing to what extent it will approve the plan, which in its current form would deliver a dramatic increase in aid to counteract underlying conditions that led to 2014’s unaccompanied minor crisis at the U.S. border.

Interesting takes on the "holdup" surrounding President Obama's proposed aid request for Central America. Manuel Orozco seems to believe that the plan is solely the idea of the Inter-American Development Bank. Eric Olson argues that US congressmen are hung up on devising benchmarks to actually measure political will but that they are having a difficult time doing so. The State Department, on the other hand, was few benchmarks as it does not want the assistance program to look too heavy-handed. They want the plan to be characterized as one element of a partnership between the US and the region.

This feels like the debate over certification during the 1980s in Central America. We have partners in whom we have varying levels of confidence but we don't always get to choose our partners. They need to demonstrate greater progress on human rights reform and democratization for us to provide assistance. Three thousand civilians were killed by right-wing death squads last month, only 2,000 were killed by the same people this month - see progress! Congress puts on a bit of a charade, holds their breath, and gives the money anyway. If anything goes wrong, which it ultimately will, Congress can say that the administration proved to them that our Central American partners were actually hitting the benchmarks. Blame the president, let Congress off the hook.

Will a Plan for Central American Prosperity Succeed?

The Inter-American Dialogue's Latin American Advisor asks Will a Plan for Central American Prosperity Succeed?

U.S. Vice President Joe Biden traveled this month to Central America to meet with the presidents of Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador. The meetings followed recent confirmation that the Obama administration would include $1 billion in security and economic development assistance for the  region in its 2016 budget under the "Alliance for Prosperity." What did Biden accomplish in Central America? Does the White House's proposed spending target the right areas, and if not, where should the focus be? What do the Central American countries need to do to make the plan work? Will concerns over corruption derail U.S. involvement in the alliance?

I wasn't asked but increased US focus on the region is a welcome development. $1 billion is probably not enough money and the US Congress will probably make it even less. Increased attention and investments need to be sustained beyond what is currently proposed. The devil is in the details of the plan and its implementation. I'm not sure that the region and the US are prepared to scale-up programs that quickly. No, I do not have as much faith in the region's elected and un-elected officials as some do. Many other things need to go right for the investment to pay off.

I still believe that it will help. You can read the varied answers here.

Oscar Romero: A faith that does justice

Thirty-five years ago, Archbishop Oscar Romero was assassinated by right-wing death squads in El Salvador. The failure of the first junta that came to power in the October 1979 coup and the murder of Archbishop Romero marked the "official" beginning of the country's civil war. Romero had supported the October coup but withdrew his support when the new government could not, or would not, get control over the military and its repressive campaign.

The US believed that extending military assistance to the Salvadoran military and government would help it to gain leverage over its more repressive elements. Romero thought that was naive and partly a consequence of US personnel who had little knowledge of the country. Instead, he wrote President Jimmy Carter and encouraged him not to increase US military to the country. Increased US assistance would only make matters worse. Romero criticized the Left who saw revolutionary violence as a potential solution to the violence of the government. The Archbishop also condemned the actions of the military and told its soldiers that they should not obey an unjust law or order that goes against the laws of God. While some on the left also seemed to have considered killing the Archbishop, Roberto D'Aubuisson and the right-wing pulled the trigger, as they did on most advocates for justice at the time.

Archbishop Romero was at the forefront of what those of us who teach in the Jesuit tradition call a faith that does justice. His understanding of the Bible led him to become actively engaged in the world around him. He didn't just speak from the pulpit to call for an end to the violence.

He worked with the women of Co-Madres and actually encouraged their organization as a group, individuals across the political spectrum in El Salvador searching for a solution to the country's violence and poverty, and diplomatic representatives from other countries interested in the country's developments, including US Ambassador Robert White.

In case you are in the area, the Education for Justice program that I direct will be screening Monseñor: The Last Journey of Oscar Romero tonight at 7pm in Brennan 228 on the University of Scranton campus.

NACLA's war by other means in El Salvador

Kevin Young has published "War by Other Means in El Salvador" in NACLA. It's an interesting piece, though I don't necessarily agree with the framing of the article and a lot of the specifics.

The “Partnership” exemplifies a more general U.S. strategy in Latin America. Since 1998 the region has elected roughly a dozen left-of-center presidents who explicitly reject U.S. intervention and neoliberal economics. In response, the United States has tried to institutionalize neoliberal policies that can constrain future governments regardless of political affiliation. In effect, Washington has sought to mitigate the danger of elections by insulating economic policy from democratic input. As the FMLN’s experience in El Salvador suggests, these left-of-center governments are heavily constrained by forces opposed to progressive change. However, both government choices and popular struggle also help to shape policies on the ground.

Bent over backwards wouldn't be the right phrase, but the Obama administration sure seems to have gone out of its way to help the Salvadoran people even though there are many in State and other levels of government that are not entirely comfortable working with the FMLN.

Given that many people in the US did not want El Salvador to receive a second MCC, qualify for the Partnership for Growth, or get any special treatment following decisions to prohibit mining, it's hard to characterize Obama policy towards El Salvador as part of any coherent US strategy. I also wonder whether people would support moving some decisions out of government hands if ARENA were still in the executive branch.

Then there's the truce - Funes and his government negotiated the pact in secret from the Salvadoran people and the US. The US criticized the truce all along even though publicly the criticisms were somewhat muted. The US has complained about drug trafficking in El Salvador and, for the most part, the Funes government responded, "you must be misinformed. There are no drugs here."

The Obama administration has most likely overlooked ALBA-related corruption, or simply brought it up quietly, behind the scenes, as previous US administrations seem to have done with ARENA previously. As a FMLN friend once said, "ARENA has its ANEP, why can't we have our ALBA?"

Again, it's an interesting characterization of US-Salvadoran relations but one that does not entirely take enough complexity into consideration in my opinion.

Democrats play hardball with Central America aid request

Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.) and Sen. Benjamin L. Cardin (D-Md.) aren't ready to push President Obama's $1 billion aid request for Central America through Congress. In fact, they want to know where all the other money went. (They ask these questions about Iraq and Afghanistan too, don't they?)

"We've spent billions of dollars there over two decades," Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.), ranking member of the Senate Appropriations foreign operations subcommittee, told Secretary of State John F. Kerry. "And we've seen conditions get worse in Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador."

...

But some lawmakers responded Tuesday that any U.S. aid program would need to overcome entrenched corruption in the region and noted the refusal of many wealthy families to spend their own money for the national good.

Private businesses in Central America "should be doing more," Leahy said. "They live behind walls. They don't pay taxes. If they don't live in Miami, they keep their money there."

"We can't just continue to layer aid programs," Sen. Benjamin L. Cardin (D-Md.) told Kerry in a subsequent Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing. "We've had many programs in Central America and the results have been less than consequential."

Tripling aid will help at the margins. That's good. Let's direct the money towards strengthening CICIG in Guatemala and creating new ones for Honduras and El Salvador; helping entrepreneurs and various civil society groups; and some rule of law projects.

No one except Biden believes that the increased assistance will "the next great success story of the Western Hemisphere." As I wrote in July

The problems in Central America are immense. We need to consider deepening our already close economic relations, craft policies that facilitate migration between the US and the region, jointly invest billions of dollars in development projects, and enact drug policy reforms. I am afraid reforms short of these will probably just help at the margins.

Deeper reforms will require significant efforts by our allies and not so allies in the Northern Triangle and a US willingness to put trade, immigration, and drug policy reforms on the table. 

Kino Border Initiative's El Comedor

The Los Angeles Times has a nice write-up on El Comedor along the US-Mexico border in Nogales

El Comedor is sponsored by the Kino Border Initiative, a binational humanitarian effort by religious organizations, including Jesuit Refugee Service / USA, Missionary Sisters of the Eucharist and the Diocese of Tucson. El Comedor served 38,667 meals to migrants in 2014.

I spent a few days volunteering at El Comedor in October 2014. You can read some of my posts here.

You can also learn more about their work and see how you can donate your time or money at the Kino Border Initiative.

Immigration policy halted by Texas judge

NYT

According to the New York Times, a federal judge in Texas suspended  President Obama's recent executive action on immigration.

In an order filed on Monday, the judge, Andrew S. Hanen of Federal District Court in Brownsville, prohibited the Obama administration from carrying out programs the president announced in November that would offer protection from deportation and work permits to as many as five million undocumented immigrants.

...

Some legal scholars said any order by Judge Hanen to halt the president’s actions would be quickly suspended by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in New Orleans.

“Federal supremacy with respect to immigration matters makes the states a kind of interloper in disputes between the president and Congress,” said Laurence H. Tribe, a professor of constitutional law at Harvard. “They don’t have any right of their own.”

It's disappointing, of course, but this is how our system works. I'm hopeful that the Court of Appeals will rule in favor of the president's recent executive actions and that the country can then take additional steps towards enacting humane and comprehensive immigration policies.

Washington Post endorses Obama aid request for Central America

The Washington Post Editorial Board has come out in lukewarm (?) support of President Obama's aid request for the Northern Triangle of Central America.

In short, the United States has a strong interest in helping Central America achieve the prosperity and stability that have so long eluded it. President Obama’s fiscal 2016 budget proposal addresses that interest with a request for $1 billion in aid to the northern triangle. A little more than half of that would go to beefing up the countries’ security forces and public institutions, with the rest going to economic development. This would be the first installment on a five-year program of still-undetermined size, officials say.

This is the first that I've heard of US financial support for a five-year program. I might be wrong but I am guessing that this is one billion of the fifteen billion that Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador are looking for to support their five-year plan. However, the link from the Post goes to the White House's Fact Sheet from June that only mentions two small USAID plan that will run for five years so it's not entirely clear. I haven't read that the Administration is prepared to ask for increased resources not just next year, but every year after. That's what I had in mind earlier this week.  

The WP isn't ready to proclaim the surge in unaccompanied minors over but they are somewhat optimistic by this year's number of migrants which is down from last year. It makes sense - most who can and want to leave have done so already. That should provide respite for a few months or so. However, the decreased flow out of Central America means that this will still be the second highest year on record. That's not something to celebrate.

I'm with their call for economic and physical security. Who isn't?

I really need to get more familiar with Plan Colombia because it has apparently solved world peace. Everybody loves it or everybody thinks that it is very useful to persuade reluctant members of Congress to support whatever initiative that our heart's desire.

High quality leadership is needed in the region. We are on board here. A colleague and I tried to get an op-ed published on this month's ago but no luck.

The concern with the FMLN manipulating "constitutional rules for their advantage" - somewhat confusing unless you are speaking about Decree 743 and the packing of the courts a few years ago. To reduce the crisis to FMLN manipulation, however, would be naive and sustained for simply partisan means. Aligning with Venezuela? Well, you have Alba Petroleos but that sure seems like the extent of it. FMLN and El Salvador alignment with Venezuela might be an issue but it hasn't come up since US right wing forces tried to sabotage the FMLN in last year's presidential election. That's not to say that there are not problems with corruption and transparency. To be fair, they did highlight insecurity in Honduras earlier in this post.

Finally,

Mr. Obama’s aid plan is appropriately ambitious and generous; over the coming years, though, it must also be conditioned on recipients’ fulfillment of conditions related to transparency and respect for human rights. That approach, or a version of it, has been tried before in Latin America, both in Colombia and in Central America during the 1980s. Congress and the administration must adapt a new conditionality for the Central America crisis of today.

The aid plan is welcome news. However, I would stop short of calling it "ambitious and generous." It breaks down to $33 per capita. I cringe, however, at the next statement which goes on about conditionality. There needs to be some accountability for the money and the programs, but conditionality like this does not have a good history in Central America. Here is a paragraph that mostly got cut from my recent World Politics Review analysis.

I do not doubt that the countries of the Northern Triangle have carried out some reforms that indicate a willingness to make hard decisions. However, it feels somewhat reminiscent of the Cold War when President Ronald Reagan’s administration would go before the US Congress to certify that the Salvadoran military and government were taking human rights more seriously because they had killed fewer people than the previous month. We can point to isolated examples of progress but it is challenging to identify sustained progress.

The conditions that the US placed on aid to El Salvador during the 1980s had some success. The Salvadoran military, when pressured, did respond to US calls to respect human rights - not absolutely, but better. However, it also led members of the US Reagan administration to go before Congress and the media to lie about significant progress. It also led many members of Congress to play dumb and simply pass all responsibility for the failures of US policy to the executive branch.  

Reaganites Should Be Embarrassed

When discussing US policy towards El Salvador during the Cold War, it is often important to break down the actions/motivations/intentions of the US Embassy staff and ambassador, CIA personnel and station chief, and Defense attaches operating in El Salvador. They were not always on the same page and often competed against each other to gain the ears of officials in Washington. 

In Washington, we often have to sort through what was going on in the executive and the legislative branches, Republican and Democratic parties. We also have to look at what was going on in the State Department, USAID, and Defense Department. And we have to understand how they all cooperated with each other and, perhaps more frequently, how they operated against each other. Then there's trying to figure out what they said publicly versus what they thought and did privately. It's really not that simple.

However, when it comes to Roberto D'Aubuisson, some people just flat out embarrassed themselves, the US government, and the US people. 

Joel Gillon has a good one in The New Republic with Pope Francis Just Declared This Murdered Archbishop a Martyr. Reaganites Should Be Embarrassed.

After D'Aubuisson entered politics in 1982, then-U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador Deane R. Hinton called D’Aubuisson a “fine young Democrat,” later declaring him “an intelligent man” and a “dynamic leader.” Senator Jesse Helms was an unabashed supporter, suggesting that D’Aubuission’s credentials as “free enterprise man” who was “deeply religious” were more important than accusations that he murdered civilians. Elliott Abrams, then assistant secretary of state for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, told a congressional committee that the former army major was not an extremist because one would have to be “involved in murder” to earn that designation.

Members of the Religious Right also offered their support to D’Aubuisson in the 1980s. Pat Robertson claimed to have gone to dinner with D’Aubuisson, calling him a “very nice fellow.” D’Aubuisson was honored at a 1984 dinner at the Capitol Hill Club by a number of conservative groups, including the Moral Majority, the National Pro-Life Action Committee, and The Washington Times. He was presented a plaque for his “continuing efforts for freedom.” On another visit to Washington, D’Aubuisson was chaperoned around the city by Young Americans for Freedom.

They should but I wouldn't hold my breath. 

And while what Ambassador Hinton said was horrifying, he left office one year later because he criticized right-wing death squads in El Salvador. Here is the New York Times in 1983 

The Administration official said Mr. Hinton was being replaced because he had grown weary of the job, one of the most grueling State Department diplomatic posts.

Mr. Hinton has been at the center of disputes in his last two years in San Salvador. He himself was Mr. Reagan's choice to replace Robert E. White as Ambassador. The Administration felt Mr. White was too sympathetic to the idea of negotiating with the insurgents in El Salvador; Mr. Hinton has on occasion criticized the Salvadoran Government for its human rights record.

Some officials have said recently that Mr. Hinton had also been ineffective in presenting the Administration's case on television. Others said he had embarrassed the White House by saying right-wing ''death squads'' were as much a threat to the Salvadoran Government as leftist insurgents.

An Administration official praised Mr. Hinton today for having done a good job under fire. He said Mr. Hinton wanted to leave his post soon and settle down. ''Deane is tired,'' the official said. ''He wants out.''

From what I remember, part of Ambassador Hinton's being tired was tied directly to death threats on his life from Roberto D'Aubuisson. Pulling out a single quote from the Ambassador, even several, does not tell the entire story.

However, at the end of the day, our relationship with Blowtorch Bob was clearly one of the darkest stains on our involvement in El Salvador.

U.S. Can’t Solve Central America’s Problems With Money Alone

I have a new article with the World Politics Review entitled U.S. Can’t Solve Central America’s Problems With Money Alone.

On Jan. 29, in an op-ed for The New York Times, U.S. Vice President Joe Biden announced that the White House would request $1 billion from Congress in its 2016 budget to finance a range of development, security and good governance initiatives in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, often referred to as Central America’s Northern Triangle. The news is a welcome announcement for a region that is suffering from the effects of long-term poverty, inequality and insecurity. Despite the promise of U.S. aid, however, a great deal will have to fall into place for Washington’s new commitment to Central America to deliver much-needed results on the ground.

I'm skeptical that the president will get what he wants from Congress and that the US and its Northern Triangle partners have the ability to carry out meaningful reform in the short-term. However, even incremental improvements are worth the financial expenditures.

Check it out here.

Sen. Tom Carper (D-DE): US must help Central American neighbors

Senator Tom Carper has an op-ed in The Hill arguing that the US must help Central American neighbors. Sen. Carper is a Democrat from Delaware who serves on the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Environment and Public Works, and the Finance committees.

With courage, hard work, leadership and help from its neighbors, the Northern Triangle could follow in Colombia’s footsteps. Given that America’s drug addiction contributes to the misery in the Northern Triangle, we need to be part of that effort. We can’t do it for them, but we have a moral — and fiscal — obligation to help.

Over the past decade, our nation has spent nearly $250 billion to strengthen our borders and enforce our immigration laws. Meanwhile, we have spent less than 1 percent of that amount to help address the root causes — fear, hopelessness, lack of economic opportunity and corruption — that compel so many Central Americans to risk life and limb to come here.

The children and families arriving at our border truly are some of the neighbors we’re reminded to love as ourselves in the parable of the good Samaritan. By tackling the root causes driving this surge in migration, and helping these countries help themselves, we will not only make a meaningful difference in the lives of millions of people — we’ll likely save American taxpayers billions of dollars. 

I'd say he is a bit too optimistic about the sustainability of Central American initiatives of the last few months and, perhaps, Colombian success. I'm not sure what type of commitment he is looking to support but one could read this as US support for drug policy reform, billions in assistance, and, if Colombia is a model, increased US military and security personnel. Senator Carper's call to arms works nicely with the Northern Triangle's Alliance for Prosperity, which he mentions, but is he calling for support beyond the region's hyper-infrastructure plan?

Anyway, I am happy to hear a US Senator calling for the US government to engage with Central America in a way that does not emphasize increased militarization of the border and punishment as a result of being too poor as does Rep. Randy Weber (R-TX).

Thank you.

That sounds closer to the mark: Central America wants $15 billion

According to a statement released by the Guatemalan government, the Northern Triangle of Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador need an injection of approximately $15 billion over over four years, $5 billion each, to fund their Alliance for Prosperity. The plan is designed to increase economic growth and to reduce insecurity in order to stem the flow of nationals northward.

The financial commitment that the Northern Triangle requests seems to be much closer to what is needed than the $1 billion that Thomas Shannon mentioned during his recent visit to Guatemala (still haven't come across details). It's unclear why each country needs exactly the same amount of money, given the vast differences among them. It's also unclear how much, if any, of the $15 billion that is needed will come from their coffers - or is their contribution on top of the US' $15? For example, while the US is providing $277 in a second Millennium Challenge Corporation Compact for El Salvador, that country's government is contributing an additional $88 million.

In some ways, I'd like to see greater progress on strengthening the rule of law, reducing corruption, and improving government transparency and tax collection before the US makes such a large commitment. On the other hand, it's a bit of chicken and egg thing. Greater resources are needed before progress can be made on such issues. Perhaps each country can make an inexpensive gesture of good faith before moving forward.

For example, President Otto Perez Molina and the government of Guatemala can request an extension for the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG)) and to allow independent investigations in Perez Molina's and his vice president Roxana Baldetti's financial irregularities. El Salvador could open the books on the FMLN's Alba Petroleos and Sigfredo Reyes. Honduras could invite stepped-up international assistance to resolve unsolved murders committed against journalists, lawyers, and land and human rights advocates.

It doesn't hurt to ask for the moon but be ready to settle for the stars.

Obama to ask for $1 billion for Central America?

At the same time that Republican members of Congress are introducing legislation to punish Central American governments over their inability to stem migration to the US and to punish the Department of Homeland Security if they do not gain 100% "operational control" over our southern border, President Obama is asking Congress for $1 billion in assistance for Central America's prosperity plan. The news came during Counselor Thomas Shannon's recent visit to Guatemala. However. I can't find anything in English just yet.

It's hard to see Congress voluntarily providing $1 billion to Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador at this moment in time that is unless all the money was support for the police and military. Perhaps there's some sort of bargain where for every $2 Congress provides to the border, they will provide $1 for the Northern Triangle. It should be the other way around but I'm not optimistic.

I also imagine that the US Congress will be more supportive of support for governments of the right in Guatemala and Honduras than they will be for the leftist government in El Salvador. Unfortunately, the governments in Honduras and Guatemala are believed to be more corrupt and less effective than that in El Salvador which has made it difficult to provide them with assistance in the past (Millennium Challenge Corporation Compacts anyone?) and their police and military more involved in repression and criminal activities which has also made it more difficult to provide them with what they desire. I want the US to engage with the people, governments, and security forces, not cut off all interactions, so that we may eventually have more confidence that a large sum (if that's what $1 billion is) will be effective. Let's just say that I am not entirely confident at this point in time.

Former US Ambassador to El Salvador Robert White (1926-2015)

Yesterday, former U.S. Ambassador Robert White passed away at the age of 88. Ambassador White spent several decades serving the US as a Foreign Service officer throughout the Americas including postings in Nicaragua in the early 1970s, ambassador to Paraguay where he had stood up to General Stroessner, and at the Latin America director of the Peace Corps.

Since retiring from the foreign service, Ambassador White continued to remain active in Latin American affairs working for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, assuming the presidency of the Center For International Policy, participating in various speaking engagements, providing expert witness testimony for legal cases with the CJA, and writing publicly on US-LA relations.

He is most fondly remember, however, for his dedication to the people of El Salvador and the US by his support for policies to try to avert civil war in that country and then to attain justice for those who suffered as a result of the subsequent war between the government and the FMLN.

"During my Foreign Service career, I did what I could to oppose policies that supported dictators, [there was no comma in Ambassador White's original post but Reuters inserted one here] and closed off democratic alternatives," he wrote in an article published in the New York Times in March 2013.

In 1981, as the ambassador to El Salvador, White said he refused a demand by the secretary of state, Alexander Haig Jr., to use official channels to cover up the Salvadoran military's responsibility for the murders of four American church workers.

"I was fired and forced out of the Foreign Service," he wrote. (Reuters)

When Ambassador White was appointed US Ambassador to El Salvador in 1980, he tried to support reformist elements in the government and the military and to convince conservative hardliners in both institutions that the US was serious in demanding improvements in the areas of human rights. However, he was undercut by the fact that US military attaches were giving contradictory messages to the Salvadoran right and by the fact that the US had little leverage of the right at this time. Our threats to withhold future aid were not taken very seriously as we were not providing very much at the time anyway. (Stanley)

However, his propensity to speak publicly and his actions would sometimes get him in trouble with Salvadorans on the right and officials in Washington (which wasn't necessarily a bad thing).

"Outspoken and with a track record that included standing up to Paraguay's General Stroessner, White had arrived in early March. Romero was impressed by his meeting with White, and White by the archbishop: his presence at Romero's Sunday mass over the following two weeks was a gesture that did not go unnoticed by any political sector.

White had known the Central American Jesuits and "where they were coming from" since his days in the U.S. embassy in Nicaragua in the early 1970s. He remembered Paco Estrada, provincial at the time, from then and had renewed his acquaintance with him at the meeting with Romero. Within a few weeks White had the first of two dinners with Estrada, Ellacuria, and Segundo Montes.

The Jesuits had asked that the dinner be "off the record," but Ellacuria's carelessness on a trip to Spain in early May breached their own request.. Warming to the Jesuits' company, White told them that if he were a Salvadoran he would be aligned with the guerrillas. No doubt delighted by this admission, Ellacuria repeated the remark, adding "he talks too much for an ambassador," in the presence of one Emilio Zuneda, who subsequently wrote up an "interview with the Rector of the UCA" for the Spanish magazine Ecclesia. The piece was reprinted in the Salvadoran newspaper Prensa Grafica and White had to answer to his bosses in the State Department. (Whitfield)  

I'm sure that he would have hoped to remain in his post and avert some of the bloodshed that was to come but he was proud not to have betrayed his principles even if it came at the cost of his diplomatic career.

“I regard it as an honor to join a small group of officers who have gone out of the service because they refused to betray their principles,” he said at the hearing.

My thoughts and prayers go out to his family and friends.

Noam Chomsky on contemporary United States - Latin American relations

Louisa Reynolds recently completed an interview with Noam Chomsky that has been published in English in Plaza Publica. The lead is a not so surprising quote of “For the first time in 500 years, Latin America has begun to free itself of imperial control."

The US strongly supported the genocide trial of Guatemala’s former dictator Efrain Rios Montt...

I think “strongly supported” is an overstatement…

The US embassy in Guatemala expressed an interest in having the trial come to a conclusion…

A quick conclusion that would not implicate the United States and its allies. After all, Rios Montt wasn’t acting in isolation. He was acting with support from the Reagan administration and when Congress blocked Reagan from direct participation in the genocidal crimes, Reagan called in his international terrorist army, Israel, to train Guatemalan officers and provide the weapons, essentially as a surrogate for the United States. The US embassy made sure that none of that was going to be brought up.

What were America’s real motivations for supporting the Rios Montt trial? Was it concern over the possibility of having a failed state in its back yard? 

There were undoubtedly people in the US embassy that were interested in pursuing it but as far as government policy is concerned it seems to me it was tolerated as long as the US and its allies were excluded; that was always crucial. The US has no real objection to crimes being prosecuted locally as long as the international aspect doesn’t enter. It happens all over the place...

The US has been strongly supportive of the case against Rios Montt. Of that, I have little doubt. However, I get the impression that the US has been more of a cheerleader rather than a prosecutor which is how it should be.

For the most part, the Obama administration's approach to Central America has been to let Central Americans take the lead and for the US to nudge policy in a direction we find more acceptable. Republicans and leftist sympathizers prefer that the use a sledge hammer - just usually forcing action in opposite directions. Sometimes that happens (accepting Honduras back in to the democratic fold, CICIG and Rios Montt, arbitration against Guatemala on labor rights) and sometimes it doesn't (perhaps the Monsanto laws fall here, wanting El Salvador to do more to crack down on money laundering and corruption).

Had Guatemalans not been at the forefront of pushing for the prosecution of Rios Montt, my guess is that the US Embassy would have stayed relatively, if not completely, silent.

Speaking of which, Rios Montt's re-trial resumed today in Guatemala. Following on Twitter, there looks to have been some excitement with a demand that the former general and dictator show up in court (he had been claiming that he's too sick to attend) and a motion to have one of the justices removed (Judge Valdez wrote her master's thesis on the genocide in Guatemala - see this post from June 2013).

#Guatemala's ex-dictator Rios Montt was wheeled into court by paramedics for 1st day in court. Theatrics or old age? pic.twitter.com/hvfIlM3NYt
— Geoff Ramsey (@PanAmericanPost) January 5, 2015

I was wrong. I honestly didn't think that Rios Montt would see the inside of a courtroom but there Bernie he is

[UPDATE - Not much of a surprise but Judge Irma Jeannette Valdés Rodas is off the case and a new judge will have to be appointed. No idea yet of the timeline.]

In a majority decision, the court accepts defense argument that Judge Valdez is biased; the #RiosMontt trial is postponed #EyesonJan5
— guatemalajustice (@guatejustice) January 5, 2015