Tuesday, April 28, 2015

University of Scranton Teach-In on Torture


On Thursday, Education for Justice will host a Teach-In on Torture during which several University of Scranton faculty will address our office's 2014-2015 annual theme through their disciplinary and interdisciplinary perspectives. The presentation schedule is as follows:

Love, Justice, and Torture (8:30 AM - 9:45 AM) 
  • Dr. Cyrus Olsen (Theology)
  • Dr. Matt Meyer (Philosophy) 
Enhanced Interrogations and Terror: Historical, Legal, and Psychological Perspectives (10:00 AM - 11:15 AM) 
  • Dr. Jessica Nolan (Psychology)
  • Dr. Michael Jenkins (Sociology/Criminal Justice)
Beneath the Blindfold (11:45 AM - 12:45 PM)
  • Film screening led by Justine Johnson (Director of the Jane Kopas Women’s Center)
Guantanamo and the War on Terror (1:00 PM - 2:15 PM)
  • Dr. Harry Dammer (Sociology/Criminal Justice)
Hell House: Scaring the Jesus into You (2:30 PM - 3:45 PM)
  • Dr. Hank Willenbrink (English & Theater)
What’s in a Name? Semantics and Torture in the War on Terror (4:00 PM - 5:15 PM)
  • Dr. Teresa Grettano (English & Theater)
The day-long event will take place in the PNC auditorium (LSC 133) at the University of Scranton and is free and open to the public. 

Monday, April 27, 2015

God Alone Was With Us: 1981 massacre of Santa Cruz, El Salvador


In November, 1981, during the height of the Salvadoran armed conflict, an estimated 1,200 soldiers invaded the rural northern province of Cabañas, El Salvador, to carry out a “cleansing operation.” Survivors of the invasion, however, tell a story of carnage, in which the armed forces directly targeted the unarmed civilian population, including the elderly and women carrying children, using ground forces and aerial bombardment and resulting in the death of untold numbers of campesinos. In particular, hundreds are estimated to have been killed in the massacre of Santa Cruz, which took place at the site of the schoolhouse in Santa Cruz, in the municipality of Ilobasco, department of Cabañas, on November 14, 1981.
Since 2013, Unfinished Sentences has worked with partners in El Salvador, Spain, and the United States in an effort to understand and document what happened at Santa Cruz. Today we present the report God Alone was with Us, the first comprehensive study of this massacre, along with an 18-minute documentary detailing the events of the massacre and survivors’ renewed fight for truth and justice.
Unfinished Sentences presents God Alone Was With Us: Report and video document 1981 massacre of Santa Cruz.

Sunday, April 26, 2015

"Out! Out! Out!"

Plaza Publica
Thousands of protesters turned out in Guatemala City to demand the resignation of President Otto Perez Molina and Vice President Roxana Baldetti .
Protesters gathered for the demonstration, which they dubbed "Give Up Already," banging pans and blowing whistles as they marched to the National Palace waving the Guatemalan flag.
"We do not want thieves to continue to rule us, to see us as toys, it is brazen what they do with the people of Guatemala," protester Maria Letona told AFP.
PanAm Post gives a number of 15,000 protesters but it's not clear where that estimate comes from. (Update: 20,000 - 30,000 maybe but nothing official). That's a pretty significant number but probably not enough to force either the vice president or president to resign at this time. We'll have to see where the protests go from here. Either way, I'm impressed with the turnout by Guatemalans demanding the resignations of the president and vice president. A remarkable day.

I know I shouldn't be but I'm still amazed that this level of corruption is going on eight years into CICIG's mandate, especially if the fraud goes directly to Perez Molina and Baldetii as most seem to suspect. It's possible that the vice president and the president won't be able to complete their terms in office but we are going to need additional evidence that they are the individuals referred to on the SAT audio tapes provided by the Public Ministry and CICIG.

I'm wondering how much the SAT scandal hurts Obama's aid plan for the Northern Triangle. Members of the US Congress have been pretty outspoken in sharing their concerns about providing our Central American partners with additional sums of money at the same time that we know so much corruption is occurring in the region. Vice President Biden seemed to condition aid on an extension of CICIG's mandate. That would be one way that Guatemalan political elites could demonstrate their commitment to tackling corruption.

CICIG's mandate was eventually extended but only because they went public about corruption leading all the way up to the vice president's office, if not higher. I'm not sure that is what they had in mind.

Saturday, April 25, 2015

Community-based crime and violence prevention success in Central America

The Latin American Public Opinion Project recently released its study on the effectiveness of USAID programs in Central America with USAID’s Community‐Based Crime and Violence Prevention Approach in Central America Found Effective in LAPOP Impact Evaluation. Basically, everything that USAID is doing is effective and should be the foundation for additional US assistance to Central America - not going on a war footing in El Salvador. However, and not surprisingly, not all programs are equally successful.
Specifically, LAPOP found that the approach produced a significant reduction in the level expected of crime victimization and violence and also resulted in a significant increase in the level expected of citizens’ sense of security. Perception of neighborhood insecurity and perception of insecurity when walking alone at night declined more than would be expected without USAID intervention. Levels of satisfaction with police performance and trust in the police have increased significantly over the levels expected in the absence of the treatment. Indirect effects of the programs include strengthening democratic values, which increased significantly over the expected level in the absence of the program.
Following the qualitative and quantitative analyses, they make the following policy recommendations:
Making community‐based crime and violence prevention programs a frontline weapon to improve citizen security is key. So, too, is improving community organizations to address crime and violence.  
Schools and families also play a vital role in decreasing instances of crime and violence. Expanding pre‐school, after‐school, and day‐care access for children living in single‐parent homes would be beneficial. Working with school administrators is important. Continuing to inform administrators and teachers on important issues such as recognizing signs of abuse in children is necessary. Directing more resources to school security, especially in the form of patrols when students enter and leave school, could prove useful both in cutting down violence in the schools and protecting children from gang members who lurk outside the school grounds. Lastly, given the aforementioned positive role of religious organizations, actively partnering with these organizations to support church‐affiliated youth programs is likely to be fruitful.
The situation in Central America often feels overwhelming to me. Just where do you start amidst such poverty, violence, and corruption. However, building upon the successes of previous US AID programs, extending CICIG's mandate in Guatemala (and hopefully considering an extension to the rest of Central America, and some limited immigration reform on the part of the US can bring about an improvement in the quality of life of a significant number of Central Americans.

Thursday, April 23, 2015

Two more years! Two more years!

On Thursday afternoon, President Otto Perez Molina agreed to support a two-year extension for the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG). Perez Molina's about-face comes after a barrage of domestic and international criticism. Several months ago, Perez Molina said that CICIG would not continue after its mandate expired in September. His public arguments against a renewal of CICIG's mandate would range from the commission violates Guatemalan sovereignty to it's time for the country's political institutions to stand on their own. Two members of the commission responsible for making a recommendation on CICIG's future, had already made their intentions known.  

However, support for CICIG came from around the world (US, UN, European donors, WOLA) and within Guatemala (NGOs, businessmen, the media). Perez Molina still didn't seem convinced. He just became more annoyed. However, the arrests of people closely tied to Perez Molina, Vice President Baldetti, and the Patriotic Party severely weakened his hand. First, CICIG and the Public Ministry moved against Byron Lima and his prison empire. Second, and more recently, they moved against a criminal network involved in defrauding Guatemalans of millions of dollars in taxes.

Audio recordings related to the most recent scandal allude to presidential and vice presidential involvement in the customs fraud. While no charges have been filed against the president, the vice president, or the interior minister, they look dirty at worst and incompetent at best.

CICIG and their Guatemalan partners have done tremendous work in Guatemala. However, even with CICIG's presence, we've still witnessed pretty shady judicial rulings and questionable decisiosn with regards to criminal cases against Giamattei, Portillo, and Efrain Rios Montt, the term of Claudia Paz y Paz, and the selection of the country's high court justices. I am hopeful that two more years of CICIG will result in a transformative experience for the country's judicial institutions, but I am not optimistic.

"Political facade for repression" in El Salvador?

The AFP has an update with what is going on with As gang violence surges, El Salvador fears bloody war. After two years of escalating violence, including a "bloody first three months of the year, in which 23 police and six soldiers were killed in clashes with gangs" and the most violent month in over a decade, President Salvador Sanchez Ceren has up the ante by establishing "four 'rapid response' battalions -- one for the police and three for the army." He has also ordered the transfer of gang leaders currently held in the country's prison system to locations which will make it more difficult for them to communicate with family and associates.
The country is now in a "defining moment" in its drawn-out fight against the ultra-violent gangs Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18, said security expert Juan Ramon Medrano.
"The government has not given up on prevention and rehabilitation, (but) it is fighting the gangs with intensifying repression, which has unleashed an escalation of violence," he told AFP.
In addition to creating the rapid response battalions (horrible name, no?), the army has increased its troop presence in areas of the country where they have received intelligence that gang members have been receiving sophistical training. The response in escalation by the police and government comes after the government established a Public Security Council which presented a $2.1 billion prevention and policing plan to address the insecurity.

Raul Mijango criticizes the plan as a "political facade for repression" which, in some ways, would put it in the same vein as those plans launched by ARENA's Flores and Saca. Two differences, however, might be that ARENA seemed to have pursued its mano dura policies of a decade ago with fewer concurrent investments in other areas and it did so simply with electoral considerations in mind.

There wasn't the equivalent support for social programs such as has happened under the FMLN - health, education. And there wasn't much of a plan - let's just make it look like we are doing something, something that a large percentage of the population wanted, until the elections are over. Locking people up until the elections are over (what 90% were released within a few months of the elections?) wasn't much of a plan.

Rightfully so, Salvadoran media has been very critical of Sanchez Ceren and the FMLN's approach to public security. So has international coverage to a certain extent. I still feel, however, that the criticism has been somewhat muted simply because the FMLN is carrying out this plan rather than ARENA.

Wednesday, April 22, 2015

Guatemalans were right to be unhappy with their 2011 presidential candidates

Jorge Dan Lopez/Reuters
For some reason, I was thinking about this post (Most Guatemalans unhappy with options in this weekend's presidential election) that I wrote in September 2011 days before Guatemala's presidential elections.
I really can’t say that the 2011 electoral campaign has been a major step forward for Guatemalan democracy.
In terms of the presidential candidates, front runner Otto Perez Molina of the Patriotic Party is an alleged war criminal from the country's civil war years and a person who retains close ties to hidden powers in the postwar period. I always thought that given what we’d read about Perez, he would have been on the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala’s (CICIG) radar. Now, there’s a good chance that he’ll be president.
Anyone want to convince us that Baldizon would have been better?
Given that Sandra Torres cannot compete, Manuel Baldízon of LIDER is now running as Perez' main competitor. Baldízon is a politician who offered $61,000 to other members of congress to switch to his new political party LIDER. Offering cash to switch parties is not illegal, but it’s not something that inspires confidence. It speaks to the general weakness of the country’s parties and overall party system.
Baldízon and his family are also allegedly connected to drug trafficking and organized crime in the Peten. Those are still illegal. CICIG anyone? While Baldízon does not believe that he is the messiah, he is perfectly willing to pretend that he is in order to capture votes in this weekend’s contest.
 Hopefully, we will find out soon about CICIG and OPM but don't forget about Baldizon.

Tuesday, April 21, 2015

Early attempts to negotiate an end to the Salvadoran civil war

Ricardo Valencia carried out a brief interview with Salvadoran Ambassador to the United States Francisco Altschul for the USC Center on Diplomacy's CPD Blog. Ambassador Altschul was a member of the FMLN-FDR diplomatic commission during the civil war and spent a great deal of the war engaged in public diplomacy in the United States and Europe.
The FMLN-FDR's job was to promote and to sell the idea of the urgency of a political settlement in Washington, D.C. The basic idea was to make people understand that the best solution for everybody involved was the process of dialogue and negotiation, and that the FMLN was serious in its call for a political settlement, the idea of negotiations was not simple tactical move.
I'm pretty sure that Ambassador Altschul was referring to the late 1980s but there were also moments in the early years of the war where the FMLN and moderate civilian and military officials as well as the Cubans were exploring the possibility of a political solution.

In Back Channel to Cuba: The Hidden History of Negotiations between Washington and Havana, William LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh document efforts by Cuba to reach out to the US to resolve the Salvadoran civil war through negotiations. El Faro has an excerpt (more of less).

In February 1981, Cuba reached out to the US and indicated its support for negotiations. As a demonstration of good will, the Cubans had reduced military support for the FMLN. Here we are only weeks removed from the FMLN's first final offensive and Reagan's January 20th inauguration. The Mexican government also tried to mediate in July, October and November 1981 and then February to April 1982. Lopez Portillo's government had become very close to Nicaragua and had become very engaged in Central America overall, which didn't sit well with the US. The Mexican and French governments would then sign A Common Position Between Mexico and France Regarding El Salvador, which would recognize the FMLN as a belligerent force in 1981.

From what Alberto Martin and I have found, the Cubans were encouraging the FMLN and the URNG to negotiate a political solution to the war so as to consolidate the revolutionary processes in Cuba and Nicaragua. Another victory by leftist forces in El Salvador, less likely Guatemala, might have increased the possibility of direct US military intervention on the isthmus - something that they wished to avoid. Here is what we wrote in Unity and Disunity in the FMLN (let me know if you'd like a copy):
The available information suggests that the PCS, the RN, and the Popular Social Christian Movement (MPSC) explored the possibility of negotiations with the governing junta, controlled by the PDC, before the March Constituent Assembly elections (U.S. Department of State 1982).3 According to Eduardo Sancho, a former RN leader and member of the FMLN General Command, the FMLN signed a pact in Havana in 1982 on the initiative of the RN and the ERP, whereby it agreed to renounce its pursuit of a dictatorship of the proletariat and to accept a democratic process (Sancho 2004). Not everyone agreed with the declaration, but after making clear his reservations, FPL general secretary Carpio signed the agreement.
It is important to mention that the Cuban and Sandinista governments supported the combined strategy of negotiation and armed struggle and even pressured Carpio into accepting this change (Sancho 2004; Kruijt 2008, 64).5 Havana was apparently willing to sacrifice the revolution in El Salvador (and Guatemala) in exchange for the consolidation of the Sandinista revolution. In August 1983, the Cuban government made the U.S. government aware of its willingness to stop supplying weapons to the FMLN and to persuade FMLN leaders to participate in the political process in exchange for the United States’s ceasing its support for the Contras (U.S. Department of State 1983). The U.S. escalation in El Salvador and the slim prospect for a quick FMLN triumph were responsible for the new Cuban perspective.
This battle over FMLN political and military strategy in El Salvador contributed to the murder of Ana Maria and the suicide of Carpio.

It's possible that Cuban overtures were sincere, but the US did not trust the Cubans. I'm not entirely convinced that the FMLN or URNG were willing to sacrifice their revolutionary dreams in order to secure those of Nicaragua and Guatemala. And it is nearly certain that most military and elites in El Salvador and Guatemala wanted nothing to do with regards to negotiations with the insurgents beyond surrender and we might talk.

Monday, April 20, 2015

Reflecting on the passing of US Ambassador to El Salvador Robert White

The following post by Tommie Sue Montgomery reflects on the late US Ambassador to El Salvador, Robert White. Tommie Sue wrote the post shortly after Ambassador White's passing and was kind enough to allow me to reproduce it here. Tommie Sue has been one of the foremost experts on El Salvador for the last several decades and I will forever be grateful to her for inviting me into her home in San Salvador during one of her three Fulbrights and sharing her contacts and wisdom.

Ambassador Robert White’s passing in a sense marks the end of an era. He is being justly lauded for speaking truth to power and losing his job—U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador--for it. In the 1980s he became one of the most eloquent, vociferous critics of the Reagan Administration’s ideologically-driven, misguided and destructive Central America policy. In Washington no one was more outspoken that Bob White in denouncing the policy and advertising its flaws—and for that, Central Americans, especially Salvadorans, can be grateful.

Nevertheless, it is important to remember that it wasn’t always so, that it took the murder of four US churchwomen in December 1980 to effect Bob White’s epiphany. In the months before that, he was the dutiful ambassador, the voice for a Carter Administration desperate to avoid another Nicaragua (the Sandinistas had overthrown the US-supported Somoza dictatorship the year before). I know because I was there, doing research for a book that would be published in 1982.

Bob arrived in El Salvador in late February 1980, three months after a coup d’état, led by young, progressive army officers, ousted the brutal president-General Carlos Humberto Romero. The ambassador invited me for a long breakfast at his residence, where I shared everything I had learned during my previous months in El Salvador. The fundamental problem, I said, was that even before the coup occurred, right-wing officers managed to reassert control over events, thus derailing the good intentions of the new civilian-military junta. In this they were abetted by then-US Ambassador Frank Devine, a clueless functionary who believed that the new junta represented a thinly-disguised slide toward socialism. Thwarted at every turn, the junta resigned in late December and the second junta lasted just two months. Many of their members, threatened by death squads, went into exile. I said that El Salvador was headed for civil war, that the leftist organizations had broad popular support, and that the only alternative was to condition all military assistance on major reforms in the army—which meant cleaning out the top brass.

White arrived as the third junta was being formed. With some U.S. arm-twisting, the army accepted the hated Christian Democrats as partners and José Napoleon Duarte, who had won the presidency in 1972, been denied victory by the army, and then forced into exile for several years, now saw his chance to be “president”—of the military-dominated junta—and seized it. Ambassador White and the Carter Administration hailed this as an advance toward democracy and pretended that Duarte actually had power—until the nuns and church worker were murdered by the National Guard.

A month after Ambassador White arrived, Archbishop Oscar Romero was assassinated while saying Mass. The embassy expressed outrage and the Ambassador attended the funeral, but he did not press for an investigation, although it was obvious to everyone who knew anything about El Salvador that Romero had been murdered by a right-wing death squad tied to the military. Years later this would be confirmed.

In the intervening months state-sponsored terrorism reached new levels with hundreds of real and suspected leftists as well as prominent human rights advocates disappearing and usually turning up dead. The US Embassy lamented the deaths but downplayed their magnitude. The official line was, “El Salvador is facing a leftist (or communist) threat but is on the road to democracy.” The proof was always that Duarte was president of the junta.

In November leaders of the Democratic Revolutionary Front, a centre-left coalition, were seized from a Jesuit high school where they had scheduled a press conference. The kidnappings occurred in broad daylight; the surrounding streets had been sealed off by police, and the six men turned up dead on roads near the capital. Ambassador White expressed dismay but little more. El Salvador was still on the (difficult) road to democracy. Also in November Ronald Reagan was elected president and his foreign policy transition team wasted no time announcing to Latin America’s many military rulers that Carter’s human rights’ policy was a dead letter. The Salvadoran military and death squads understood, correctly, that they had just been given carte blanche.

Then Maura Clarke, Ita Ford, Dorothy Kazel and Jean Donovan were raped and murdered. For Bob White, the veil of hypocrisy that enveloped the Salvadoran government was torn away. He finally saw the government, the military for what it was: a bunch of right-wing, murderous thugs who would stop at nothing to preserve their power.

A month later the civil war began, lasted 11 years, cost over 70,000 dead and over $6 billion in U.S. military assistance. After peace accords in 1992 the former guerrillas became a legal political party, won the presidency in 2009 and repeated their victory in 2013. I have often wondered how different history would have been had Bob White and the Carter Administration understood in March 1980 what they finally grasped nine months later.

Sunday, April 19, 2015

Crisis upon crisis in El Salvador and Guatemala

El Salvador and Guatemala are currently in the midst of severe crises, which is saying something, since things weren't going that great in the first place. In El Salvador, the FMLN and Salvador Sanchez Ceren have fueled the fires of violence by unleashing the country's police and military against the MS-13 and the 18th Street gangs. As a result, March was the most violent month in at least a decade.

The PNC killed over 140 "gang members" during "clashes" in March. That's nearly 30% of the 481 killed last month. And as you probably figured out, some of those clashes look to have been mighty suspicious.

The situation is unlikely to improve in the near-term as President Sanchez Ceren, like his predecessors before him, is turning to the military. Here's Tim's take with From policing to a war footing:
President Salvador Sánchez Cerén announced that El Salvador's army was readying three rapid reaction battalions of 400 soldiers each which could be deployed to the most dangerous zones in the country. There are already 7000 military personnel in the streets of the country to supplement police efforts on public security.
On Saturday, the armed forces confronted gang members in the community of Uluapa Ariba, in Zacatecoluca in the department of La Paz, The Twitter account of the armed forces reported that there has been a shoot-out with as many as 30 members of the Barrio 18 gang, which left 9 gang members dead and two captured.
Perhaps as retribution, two soldiers were murdered Saturday night and early Sunday morning in different parts of the country.
The FMLN's approach to public security has been schizophrenic, to say the least, since taking office in 2009. And schizophrenic might be the nicest thing to say about its security policy. Such a disappointment.

In Guatemala, the current and former Tax Authority heads and two dozen other people were arrested on a series of charges related to corruption. They took bribes from numerous businesses in return for reducing or eliminating customs taxes. The private secretary of Vice President Roxanna Baldetti was implicated as well. He was traveling to South Korea with the Vice President when the news broke and, what do you know, his whereabouts are currently unknown.

The fraud is in the millions. The Patriotic Party's presidential candidate, Alejandro Sinibaldi, and dozens of other elected officials have already resigned from the party in an effort to save what reputation they have left. With the Byron Lima arrest and now the tax authority, the PP is toast. Lima's connection went to the interior minister and the president while the tax scandal goes directly to the vice president's office.

From some of the transcripts of CICIG and the Public Ministry's wiretaps, there are at least two more high level officials who have not been identified or arrested. The arrests are a positive development but now there have to be questions concerning the ability of the president and vice president to serve out the remaining months of their terms.    

Alternatives for Panama's gangs


Carrie Kahn investigates In Panama, Restoring Streets And Reforming Gangs At The Same Time for NPR.

Help them start their own businesses or make them your business partners.

Thursday, April 16, 2015

Give $1 billion to the Northern Triangle - no strings attached

As I mentioned the other day, Hermano Juancito was on campus to speak to students about his missionary work in Honduras. In his talk "Accompanying the Poor in Honduras," he provided students, staff, and faculty a list of best practices for short- and longer-term immersion trips. While his talk was much more complicated, it boiled down to "open your heart," "open your eyes," "open your ears," and "shut your mouth." That's not entirely fair but the lesson was not to go into a community for a few days, months or years, telling the people how things should be done or how you would do things differently.

The poor are remarkable people with exceptional skills who have figured out how to accomplish a great deal with very little. I think that reflects some of the reasons why so many relatively poor Latin American countries wind up scoring rather well on the world's most happiest countries lists.

Several other thoughts emerged, for me, during his talk. One question that came up several times related to the proposed $1 billion aid package to Central America. Will it help? I think so. Is it enough? Obviously, not. However, what I was thinking about was whether or not the US should have any say in how the money is spent. We seem to have pretty good evidence that governments giving poor people cash without any strings attached has helped improve a number of socio-economic indicators. Why not pursue the same principle in this case?

Skip the government and give money directly to the people. Now the US is not actually giving $1 billion dollars in cash. Much is the value of the services we are currently support or intend to increase. Another problem is that we are only proposing approximately $33 per person in the Northern Triangle for the entire year. That's not much. Even if we only provide assistance to half the region that falls below the poverty line we are only thinking about $66 per person which is only $5 per month.

I'd also like to see an extension of programs such as the one involving Walmart, the Asociación de Pescadores Artesanales de la Playa El Cuco (Aspescu), an USAID. They worked for two years to satisfy the sanitary and legal requirements needed for Aspescu to sell their fish to the transnational Walmart. Help Salvadoran, Honduran and Guatemalan cooperatives and small-producers gain access to US corporations in their countries and regionally. Coffee, fish, it's all good.

It was a great turnout for John's talk. We had about 100 students, faculty, and staff in the audience. That's great for our Latin American Studies program. However, hours earlier the administration retracted its support for a Fulbright Scholar that we had successfully worked to bring to Scranton from Mexico.

Wednesday, April 15, 2015

US and Latin America: A Clash of Histories

Orlando J. Pérez, Associate Dean of the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at Millersville University of Pennsylvania has an opinion piece for the Pan American Association of Philadelphia on A Clash of Histories.
The people and government of the United States have relatively short memories and believe inexorably in progress. Tomorrow is always better than yesterday! For Latin Americans history defines the present. Historical grievances shape the way countries relate to one another (for example, Bolivia’s ongoing struggle to regain its “access to the sea” from Chile). In the case of the United States, Latin Americans find it very hard to forgive and forget the alleged abuses committed against the region in the past 150 years. They remember every military invasion, CIA covert program and exploitation by U.S. transnational corporations.
For their part, U.S. leaders want to focus on the billions of dollars of aid and support for democracy. President Obama in particular has been keen on emphasizing practical solutions to problems rather than on offences that happened “before I was born.” Ironically, among the most hardline presidents at the Summit it was Raúl Castro who gave the most credit to President Obama’s new approach. After excoriating the United States for violations of Cuba’s sovereignty, Mr. Castro said “I apologize to him because President Obama has no responsibility for this.” Mr. Castro then said “President Obama is an honest man.” In acknowledging that President Obama has “no responsibility” for the past—something that leaders like Ecuador’s Correa or Venezuela’s Maduro actually disagree with—Mr. Castro is perhaps reflecting the realization that holding on to historical grievances might not serve the interest of the Cuban people or the survival of his regime.
Great insights from Orlando. Honestly, however, I'm not so sure how well the difference holds up to more intense scrutiny. I'd say that the Obama administration and Democrats in general have moved on from the Cold War. They might have problems with Castro's Cuba and Ortega's Nicaragua, but not necessarily because of those individuals and countries' Cold War histories. The Democrats will focus on the lack of democracy and human rights and corruption.

However, it is difficult to listen to Republican operatives (Noriega, Cardenas, Abrams) and elected officials (Rubio) criticizing those two countries, or the entire region's left, without emphasizing the Cold War. Republicans might mis-remember what actually happened during the Cold War, but they will never forget.

While the official/government left in the US has tried to move on, I'm not sure the public left in the US has. And even there it's been difficult. The Obama administration and State Department have tried to work with the FMLN in El Salvador but there is lingering mistrust from the US born out of Cold War histories (plus many other more recent causes of concern). Those US citizens who work / volunteer in Guatemala will always start off with the 1954 CIA coup against Arbenz 61 years years ago which isn't entirely wrong but isn't entirely helpful for trying to understand US - Guatemalan relations in 2015 (necessary but not sufficient).

Searching for Peace and Justice in Guatemala (through witnessing)

James Rodriguez
David Gonzalez in the New York Times has a nice write-up on photographer James Rodriguez of MiMundo with Searching for Peace and Justice in Guatemala. Some confusing phrases in the article, but nice to see James and other photographers (Rodrigo Abd, John Moore, Victor Blue, Jean-Marie Simon) get some recognition.
Mr. Rodriguez has been photographing exhumation of mass graves where victims of what the international community would declare to be war crimes were buried. He has also been tracking how indigenous communities have been resisting the takeover of their lands by outside interests, from mining companies to agribusinesses. Both themes echo perhaps the greatest issue that dominates life in Guatemala: the search for justice in a country that has endured great violence at the hands of the military and its allies.
I imagine that one of the real glaring omissions from the article is the insecurity under which James and other journalists in Guatemala carry out their vocation.

A big congratulations and thank you to James for helping to tell the story of Guatemala under such trying conditions.

Tuesday, April 14, 2015

Guatemala's Rios Montt trial and other assorted thoughts

I traveled to West Virginia University last week to give a presentation on The Genocide Trial of Efraín Ríos Montt and the Struggle Against Impunity in Guatemala. It was a great trip where I met with some terrific students in the political science and the Latin American Studies programs. I also gave a talk in an undergraduate international relations course about the recent unaccompanied minors crisis and the US and Central American response to the crisis.

West Virginia seems to be confronting the same challenges as we do at the University of Scranton - declining undergraduate interest in Latin American Studies and continued questions from colleagues and administrators about the universities' allocation of scarce resources to "under-performing" departments. A few years after arriving in Scranton, we were approaching 30 students enrolled in our Latin American Studies program. As we have moved to offering a major and and concentration (roughly equivalent to a minor), we are now at two majors and eleven concentrators.

I don't know if this is a general pattern.For those of us at the University of Scranton, I don't think that our students have a strong interest in international affairs. Many do, obviously, but I don't think that the level of interest reaches those at other institutions. We have a good number of students whose interest in Latin America flows from their participation in volunteer trips to the region and to the Ignatian Family Teach-In for Justice in Washington, D.C. and to the history of the Jesuits in El Salvador. However, that has not translated into interest in studying the regionally academically. One barrier is language. Students generally don't want to complete the Spanish-language requirements for completing the concentration and the major. We, the faculty, don't want to remove the requirements (yet).

We are also, unfortunately, more limited in terms of faculty than we were a few years ago. That means we offer fewer classes in the program. While one of our Spanish language professors will most likely be replaced, I can't say that the Philosophy Department's interest in hiring a philosophy professor who can teach Latin American Thought, or something similar, is high on their agenda. How is everyone else doing?

Back to Guatemala and the Rios Montt trial. The International Justice Monitor has an update with A New Judge is Appointed to Hear Genocide Trial as Final Decision Around CICIG’s Mandate Approaches.
On April 9, the high-risk appeals court named Judge Jaime Delmar Gonzalez to complete the three-judge trial court set to rehear the case against former dictator Efrain Rios Montt and his head of military intelligence, Mauricio Rodriguez Sanchez. They are charged with genocide and crimes against humanity in relation with the killing of 1,771 indigenous people and the rape and torture of many others.
A new trial was scheduled to start on January 5 but was suspended the same day after Rios Montt’s defense attorneys succeeded in forcing the recusal of Presiding Judge Jeannette Valdes. With the naming of Judge Gonzalez, there is again a full panel.
However, many obstacles remain for a new trial to start. The high-risk court’s calendar makes it unlikely that a new date can be set before 2017. Moreover, the former general’s declining health situation could impede a new trial, as he has refused to appear by video conference, as recommended by the Guatemalan national health institute. There is still an outstanding question of whether a historic amnesty might prevent the prosecution, contrary to prior domestic and international decisions on this issue. Further, the investigative judge, Carol Patricia Flores, has not yet resolved various preliminary matters and has refused to do so without Rios Montt appearing in person.
I don't remember hearing 2017 before. Ouch. There seems to be a greater likelihood that CICIG's mandate is extended than there is that Rios Montt spends another day in jail.

Next scattered thought. I invited Hermano Juancito to the University of Scranton to give a presentation on his missionary work in Honduras. John is a graduate of the University. In case you are in the area, the talk is scheduled for 6:00 PM in Brennan 228. Latin American Studies might have to do some recruiting tonight.

Sunday, April 12, 2015

Neoliberal Forms of Capital and the Rise of Social Movement Partysim in Central America

Paul Almeida has a new article in the Journal of World-Systems Research entitled Neoliberal Forms of Capital and the Rise of Social Movement Partysim in Central America. Here's the abstract:
Historical shifts in global economic formations shape the strategies of resistance movements in the global South. Neoliberal forms of economic development over the past thirty years in Central America have weakened traditional actors sponsoring popular mobilization such as labor unions and rural cooperatives. At the same time, the free market reforms produced new threats to economic livelihood and well-being throughout the region.
The neoliberal measures that have generated the greatest levels of mass discontent include rising prices, privatization, labor flexibility laws, mining projects, and free trade. This article analyzes the role of emerging antineoliberal political parties in alliance with popular movements in Central America. Countries with already existing strong anti-systemic parties in the initial phases of the global turn to neoliberalism in the late twentieth century resulted in more efficacious manifestations of social movement partyism in the twenty-first century resisting free market globalization.
Paul takes an interesting look at the participation of Central American social movement parties in several recent contentious issues, including privatizations, negotiations over CAFTA-DR, and model cities programs among others. There are a lot of potential extensions from the project. One could focus on individual social movement parties in opposition and in government (FMLN, FSLN); explain the success/failure of various social movement parties electorally and on specific issues; and transnational linkages among social movement parties.

Saturday, April 11, 2015

How's that political will working out, Mr. Biden?

Gladys Olmstead and Martin Rodrigues Pellecer have a few interesting reports on how national mega-businesses have declared themselves maquilas under the law so as to receive special benefits from the government, including paying fewer taxes and quicker response times (Los famosos detrás de las 47 maquilas: Ayau de la UFM, jefe de Pronacom y hermanos de diputado del PP, 47 megaempresas se registran como maquila para pagar menos impuestos).

According to the Central American Institute for Fiscal Studies (Icefi), economists, businessmen and opposition congressman, several large, Guatemalan companies have violated the spirit of a 1989 law that was designed to attract foreign investment to industrialize the country. Montana Mining, Monsanto, Kern's, Procter & Gamble, Cemex, Bimbo, large palm mining companies are examples of "maquilas" that have benefited from these laws. They do not scream maquila. The focus of the two articles, however, seems to be on those Guatemalan so-called maquilas businesses that have reaped the rewards.

To no one's surprise, though, they have used the law to avoid taxes which not only deprives the state of much needed revenue. Guatemala collects some of the lowest tax revenue relative to GDP of any country in Latin America. The fact that their political and economic elite have little interest in paying taxes like the rest of the world's businesses has been a source of constant criticism from the international community. The 1996 Peace Accords called for increasing tax collection which the elites scoffed at. The international community considered (and might even have cut some) reducing assistance to the country because its elites were not contributing their share. We here the same with the Alliance for Prosperity.
However, the tax breaks are not just a form of corruption depriving the state of much needed revenue, but they are a form of protectionism against competitors. Several of the companies that receive the tax benefits are connected to politicians across the political spectrum it would appear, including several in the governing Patriotic Party (PP). Jesus Antonio Ralda Sarg (PP) and his two brothers are discussed in depth in the article. Then there's the Kong family's palm oil plantation, yep, a maquila. The maquilas also sells millions of quetzales worth of goods to the Guatemalan State. They claim that there's no conflict of interests. Most of the businesses benefiting from the tax breaks didn't bother to respond to Nomada's requests for further information. Politicians, "maquilas," and CACIF don't really seem to care what anyone else thinks.

So what new industry and politician might benefit from the extension of these tax privileges originally designed to increase investments in the maquila industry but now to benefits friends? The hotel industry. And who specifically might benefit? Perhaps the next president of the country, Manuel Baldizon.

We'll have to ask Mr. Biden how this reflects a real commitment on the part of Central American elites to make difficult choices.

Latin America Will Tackle Corruption Later

Thursday, April 9, 2015

Can El Salvador continue to resist calls to investigate war time atrocities?

General Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova was deported from the United States back to his native El Salvador on Wednesday. Vides Casanova oversaw grave human rights violations committed by the Salvadoran military in the early 1980s and then lied about his role while interacting with immigration authorities in the US. Here's Nina Lakhani speaking with Terry Karl in Al Jazeera
"General Vides was not a puppet … there was no US commander above him, giving orders that he had to obey or fear for his own life. Judicial processes seek individual accountability for crimes, and this is what happened in his case," Terry Karl, professor of Political Science at Stanford University and an expert trial witness, told Al Jazeera.
"Where the US once clandestinely offered safe haven [not to mention social security payments] to former Nazis and other war criminals, it will now be easier to deport foreigners who were once top commanders, based on violations committed by [their] soldiers," she added.
Vides' deportation is a huge victory for victims and human rights campaigners, and is evidence of a striking shift in US policy.
There are also updates on Garcia and Nicolas Carranza.

The US government also asked a North Carolina court to clear the way for former vice minister of public security Inocente Montano's extradition to Spain where he is wanted on charges related to the murders of the Jesuits in 1989. (See here and here.)

In February 2013, I asked Can El Salvador continue to resist calls to investigate war time atrocities?
While much of Latin America has made significant progress in the fight against impunity for crimes committed by their country’s armed forces during the Cold War (Guatemala, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, Guatemala, etc.), El Salvador has so far been able to withstand domestic and international pressure to pursue justice for victims of the armed conflict. However, its “successful” resistance to such pressure might not last for much longer.
I don't imagine that transitional justice is at the top of Salvador Sanchez Ceren's agenda, but it might not be up to him.

Monday, April 6, 2015

Overwhelming violence in El Salvador

The National Civil Police report that March 2015 was the most violent month in at least a decade in El Salvador. They recorded 481 murders for the month, far surpassing the 438 victims recorded in October 2009.

March's escalation seems to have been brought on by several factors, including the transfer of gang leaders to new prisons, an escalation of violence between the gangs, increased violence between the gangs and the country's security forces, and, possibly, the 2015 national elections.

After approximately 40 security personnel were killed in 2014, another 17 have so far been killed this year. The government responded by reassuring its officers that should they use deadly force, they would not be second guessed. Here's what I told Nina Lakhani in El Salvador sees most deadly month in 10 years as violence overwhelms nation
“In a country with a history of extrajudicial executions by security personnel, it appears the police (and other institutions) have responded in a way that was entirely expected – greater use of force against suspected gang members,” Mike Allison, assistant professor of political sciences at Scranton University, [should read associate professor of political science at the University of Scranton] and author of the Central American Politics Blog, told The Guardian.
The gangs appear to have responded as well as there have now been three grenade attacks against police institutions in the last seven days. The police, however, have not confirmed whether the attacks have come from the gangs.

Extreme levels of violence, strong support for mano dura and vigilante justice among the population and politicians, a PNC under attack, and a divided political scene, make more comprehensive security policies, such as those envisioned by President Sanchez Ceren, difficult to realize.

Read Nina's article for The Guardian here.

Saturday, April 4, 2015

Transnational support for the Salvadoran counterrevolution

Aaron T. Bell has a terrific article on A matter of western civilisation: transnational support for the Salvadoran counterrevolution, 1979-1982 in Cold War History.
This article considers how transnational right-wing networks contributed to the origins of El Salvador's civil conflict (1980–1992) using research from the archives, scholarship, media, and popular histories of the United States, El Salvador, Mexico, and Guatemala. Salvadoran counterrevolutionaries used material resources, training, and advice procured from foreign sympathisers to develop a political-paramilitary organisation that undermined socioeconomic and political reforms through violence and intimidation, before transforming that organisation into a formal political party capable of participating in the democratisation process. Additionally, these networks facilitated right-wing Salvadoran contributions to debates in the United States over the direction of US policy in El Salvador at the beginning of the Ronald Reagan administration.
I think that the title of the article is somewhat inaccurate as the history told is more about the mobilization strategies and effectiveness of the Salvadoran right-wing to gain international support for their policies. They sought assistance in South and Central America, Taiwan and in the United States to help confront the threat posed by the revolutionary and moderate left as well as the centrist alternatives proposed by the Carter administration. As is, the title makes it sounds as if D'Aubuisson, de Sola, ORDEN, FAN, and ARENA were more passive recipients of assistance organized from outside of El Salvador rather than active participants. The article really emphasizes their agency in a way that the title does not.

Another minor quibble, is using counterrevolution in the title. Counterreaction is more common to characterize ARENA and the Salvadoran right's response to the reforms proposed by the US and PDC and the revolutionary alternative posed by the FMLN. The Contras would be an example of counterrevolutionaries organized in response to the Salvadoran revolution. Perhaps it's a disciplinary matter.

While the article covers up to the year 1982, it is really light on 1981 and 1982. There's little coverage of the relationship between the Salvadoran right and the US right in that pivotal 1981 - the January offensive, Reagan inauguration, progress on the investigation into the churchwomen murders, and the December 1981 massacre at El Mozote. And into 1982, it would have been helpful to learn more of the Salvadoran right's mobilization against the certification process imposed by the US congress on the Reagan administration, if there was such mobilization. Instead, Bell focuses on the relationship between the Salvadoran and Guatemalan right that led to the creation of ARENA.

Jesse Helms is still awful.

Bell provides some great insights into the Salvadoran right's lobbying firms located in Washington, D.C. When studying Guatemala, I don't think that I've come across any work that addresses that issue. However, there's more coverage of the Guatemalan right's relationship with the US evangelical community. I was wondering if there was the same level of success among the Salvadoran right. It's clear that they did have an important relationship, it's just absent from this article.

Anyway, it's a really solid contribution to recent academic work on the Salvadoran civil war.  


Migration in Central America: Magnitude, Causes and Proposed Solutions

Dinorah Azpuru and Violeta Hernandez have a nice overview of the causes and consequences of migration from Central America to the United States in the Konrad Adenauer's current issue on Migration and Refugees. Here is the introduction for their Migration in Central America: Magnitude, Causes and Proposed Solutions.
Migration from Central America to other countries, particularly the United States, has been occurring for many decades. But in the summer of 2014 it reached crisis proportions when thousands of Central American minors – most of them not accompanied by an adult and after a dangerous journey through Mexico – crossed the border between Mexico and the United States and willingly surrendered themselves to the U.S. Border Patrol. It was the tip of the iceberg of deep-rooted problems in Central America (more specifically in the Northern Triangle) that involve not only poverty and lack of access to basic services such as health care or education, but also growing violence in those societies. Moreover, it exposed the dysfunction of the U.S. immigration system.
These incidents made headlines for several weeks and prompted the adoption of short-term measures to stop the flow of undocumented young migrants and women with small children. Government-led media campaigns to stop the migrants, the deportation of many of them by U.S. and Mexican authorities, as well as the late summer heat in the desert areas of the border helped to slow down the upsurge. However, the underlying causes remained and normal patterns of migration continued. In November 2014, the three presidents of the Northern Triangle – Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras – launched in Washington D.C. a long-term plan, called “The Alliance for Prosperity”, to promote development in these countries and thus discourage migrants from leaving their homes. Therefore, it is worth examining the extent of migration from Central America in recent years, presenting a profile of the migrants, and discussing the push and pull factors, as well as other structural variables that contribute to migration. An assessment of the feasibility of the Alliance for Prosperity will complement the analysis.
It's a good, comprehensive piece that would work well in an undergraduate class on Latin American politics, immigration or some other related material.

Friday, April 3, 2015

US out on a limb in the Northern Triangle?

From Claire Luke's US out on a limb in the Northern Triangle?
The specifics of a proposed $1 billion assistance plan to Central America remain in limbo as the U.S. Congress tries to determine the level of political will from the presidents of Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador — the countries the plan is meant to support.
Concern over the buy-in from the Central American leaders comes as Congress is assessing to what extent it will approve the plan, which in its current form would deliver a dramatic increase in aid to counteract underlying conditions that led to 2014’s unaccompanied minor crisis at the U.S. border.
Interesting takes on the "holdup" surrounding President Obama's proposed aid request for Central America. Manuel Orozco seems to believe that the plan is solely the idea of the Inter-American Development Bank. Eric Olson argues that US congressmen are hung up on devising benchmarks to actually measure political will but that they are having a difficult time doing so. The State Department, on the other hand, was few benchmarks as it does not want the assistance program to look too heavy-handed. They want the plan to be characterized as one element of a partnership between the US and the region.

This feels like the debate over certification during the 1980s in Central America. We have partners in whom we have varying levels of confidence but we don't always get to choose our partners. They need to demonstrate greater progress on human rights reform and democratization for us to provide assistance. Three thousand civilians were killed by right-wing death squads last month, only 2,000 were killed by the same people this month - see progress! Congress puts on a bit of a charade, holds their breath, and gives the money anyway. If anything goes wrong, which it ultimately will, Congress can say that the administration proved to them that our Central American partners were actually hitting the benchmarks. Blame the president, let Congress off the hook.

Thursday, April 2, 2015

Guatemala: Fighting Megaprojects

Frontline Defenders recently produced a 9-minute video on Guatemala: Fighting Megaprojects
Micaela Antonio and Alberto Baltazar are land rights defenders and members of the Mayan Plurinational Government of the Q’anjob’al, Chuj, Akateka, and Popti’ and Mestizo peoples. The Plurinational Government gathers 14 Mayan tribes defending the Mayan territory against currently over 40 megaproject concessions.

Wednesday, April 1, 2015

Conversion and Exit from Central American Gangs

Robert Brenneman of St. Michael's College recently published an article on Wresting the Devil: Conversion and Exit from Central American Gangs in the Latin American Research Review.
Abstract: A crisis of urban violence has emerged in northern Central America during the past two decades. Although youth gangs are responsible for only a portion of this violence, punitive approaches to dealing with gang violence have sharpened public hostility toward gang members and created a context conducive to the practice of “social cleansing” aimed at reducing gang violence by eliminating gang-affiliated youth through extrajudicial executions.
Against this backdrop of public anger and resentment aimed at gang youth, a sizeable number of Evangelical-Pentecostal pastors and lay workers have developed ministries aimed at rescuing gang members and restoring them to society, often making considerable sacrifices and taking personal risks in the process.
After describing the difficulties and risks associated with leaving the gang, this article takes a sociological approach to gang member conversions to discover the resources that Evangelical- Pentecostal congregations and gang ministries offer to former gang members facing the crisis of spoiled identity. I draw on semistructured interviews conducted in 2007 and 2008 with former gang members and gang ministry coordinators in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, and a handful of follow-up interviews conducted in 2013.
Religious exits from gangs do not appear to have ever been that successful and, from what I read, have become less so since these interviews were conducted.

See also Brenneman's Homies and Hermanos: God and Gangs in Central America